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THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF
ARTICLE IV
David S. Bogen*
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV is deeply rooted in the histori-
cal context of English law. It developed from colonial charter provisions and the
position of the colonists as subjects of a common king, evolved as the colonies ex-
panded, survived the Revolutionary War in the Articles of Confederation and was
eventually adopted in the Constitution. This Article traces the history of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause in order to elaborate on the original intent embodied in its
language.
Professor Bogen states that the clause did not embody natural law concepts, but
was solely concerned with creating a national citizenship. He contends that fear of a
natural law interpretation has incorrectly prevented the Court from finding the clause
applicable to citizens in the state where they reside. He suggests that a full examina-
tion of the historical origin of the clause could lead to a more concrete basis for
judicial interpretation. In addition to the right to be free of discrimination based on
non-residence when citizens of one state visit another state, the author concludes that
the Privileges and Imm unities Clause of Article IV secured for citizens of the United
States the right to interstate travel and to become citizens of other states without dis-
crimination based on place of prior residence.
THE COMMITTEE appointed to prepare an Exposition of the Con-
federation, a plan for its complete execution and supplemental ar-
ticles report, . . . that the Confederation requires execution . .. [bly
describing the privileges and immunities to which the citizens of one
State are entitled in another.'
INTRODUCTION
The first sentence of article IV, section 2 of the United States
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. B.A. (1962), LL.B. (1965), Harvard
University; LL.M., New York University (1967). This Article developed from a seminar
conducted by Professors Ralph Rossum and Lino Graglia at Claremont McKenna College
under the auspices of the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH). A research grant
from the University of Maryland School of Law also assisted the Article's development. The
sponsorship of NEH and the Maryland Law School are gratefully acknowledged. Frances
Kessler provided research assistance. My colleagues at Maryland, Andrew King, Robin
West and Greg Young, saved me from some errors, but they are, of course, not responsible
for those that perversely remain.
1. 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, at 894 (G. Hunt ed.
1912) [hereinafter JOURNALS].
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
Constitution sets forth the obligation which each state owes to the
citizens of other states: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."2
This provision was derived from article IV of the Articles of Con-
federation which James Wilson described at the Constitutional
Convention as "the Article of Confederation making the Citizens of
one State Citizens of all." 3 Alexander Hamilton wrote in the Feder-
alist Papers that: "It may be esteemed the basis of the Union that
the 'citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the several States.' ,4
The principle that states have a special obligation to the citizens
of other states was crucial in developing a common national iden-
tity. Fortunately, the principle's vitality did not depend upon pre-
cise definition of the obligation it imposed, for uncertainty over its
application was voiced at the outset. When the Articles of Confed-
eration were ratified, the congressional committee on implementa-
tion noted a need to describe the privileges and immunities which
citizens of one state were entitled to in another state under article
IV's predecessor.5 Neither the committee nor Congress ever clari-
fied the clause further.
Two centuries after the article IV privileges and immunities
clause ("clause") was adopted, disagreement continues over its
meaning and application.6 The clause's history has played little role
in the debate. The absence in judicial opinion of any detailed his-
torical study of the clause reflects in part the lack of discussion in
scholarly literature.7 One reason for this absence may be the spar-
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
3. NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY
JAMES MADISON 441 (A. Koch ed. 1966) [hereinafter NOTES OF DEBATES]. See also THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 272 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinaf-
ter RECORDS].
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
5. See supra note I and accompanying text.
6. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978) (6-3 decision on
whether privileges and immunities is limited category of fundamental rights or whether all
discrimination must be justified); United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Cam-
den, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (8-1 decision on application of clause to laws discriminating on basis
of municipal residence); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985) (application of
a least restrictive alternative test to discrimination). See also Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55,
71 (1982) (O'Conner, J., concurring); Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 106 S. Ct. 2317,
2329, 2330, 2333 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (argue that the right to settle in another
state is protected through an art. IV basis to challenge durational residency requirements).
7. But see P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM AND
COMITY 30-40 (1981) (impact of art. IV on interstate travel with slaves); J. KEIrNER,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 220-30 (1978) (notes
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sity of the record on the clause's adoption. There is virtually no
report of significant discussion of the clause's meaning prior to its
adoption in the Constitution. Only scattered comments and early
drafts shed light on its intended scope.
This Article sets forth the fragmentary record of article IV's
adoption and speculates, based on that record, about the intent of
the article IV Framers. It poses more questions than it answers, for
a closer look at the clause's origins discloses the relevance of colo-
nial and English feudal history. This Article is a preliminary
sketch. It is intended to encourage others to explore and augment
the story or to demonstrate that the development took a different
line.
The outline drawn here suggests that the privileges and immuni-
ties clause was not a reference to natural law, but was solely con-
cerned with creating a national citizenship. It referred to the rights
of citizens of the nation to travel freely among the states, to become
full citizens of any state they wished without discrimination based
on place of prior residence, and to be free of discrimination based
on nonresidence when they merely visited another state. At the
same time, privileges and immunities were an evolving concept, so
that the specific understandings held in 1787 should not control
modern decisions. These tentative conclusions support Justice
O'Connor's position that durational residence cases should be ana-
lyzed under Article IV. They also support the proposition that all
laws are within privileges and immunities clause, and that the key
issue under Article IV is whether distinctions based on residence
can be justified.
I. COLONIAL CHARTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF ENGLISHMEN
[A]ll and every the Persons being our Subjects, which shall
dwell and inhabit within every or any of the said several Colonies
and Plantations, and every of their children, which shall happen
to be born within any of the Limits and Precincts of the said
several Colonies and Plantations, shall HAVE and enjoy all Lib-
erties, Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Do-
minions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding
sparseness of debate on art. IV in Constitution or Articles of Confederation); R. HOWELL,
THE PRIVILEGES & IMMUNITIES OF STATE CITIZENSHIP (1918) (art. IV traced to treatment
afforded alien merchants in England); Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True Mean-
ing of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1967)
(art. IV permits federal enforcement of natural rights); Comment. The Interstate Privileges
and Immunities: Fundamental Rights or Federalism, 15 CAP. U.L. REV. 493 (1986) (funda-
mental rights analysis violates intent of Framers).
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and born, within this our Realm of England, or any other of our
said Dominions.8
The absence of prolonged public controversy over the adoption
of the privileges and immunities clause in both the Articles of Con-
federation and the Constitution indicates that the principle was not
an innovation. The Articles were drafted during the American
Revolution; consequently, the clause's background must be sought
in pre-revolutionary rights in colonies other than the colonists'
own.9 Those rights flowed from political theory, express agreement
and experience. The colonists had a common political tie to the
King of England, colonial charters that expressly guaranteed them
rights in other colonies, and practical experience of movement
across the colonial boundaries.
A. Subjects of a Common King-Calvin's Case
The colonists, like all King's subjects, were free from alienage
disabilities under English common law in English courts. Further-
more, the courts in the British colonies followed this common law
principle and, therefore, colonists were free from the disabilities of
alienage in the courts of other colonies. This principle was clearly
stated in 1608, on the eve of colonization, when Lord Edward Coke
and the English judges decided Calvin's Case."° Under English law,
aliens could not own real property in England. The question in
Calvin's Case was whether one born in Scotland, after the Scottish
King James had ascended the English throne, could inherit English
land. Although England and Scotland had a common king, each
had a separate parliament. Lord Coke held that persons subject to
the same King could not be aliens to each other. "Lastly, whoso-
8. THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETOFORE
FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3788 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (citing the Virginia
Charter of 1606) [hereinafter THORPE].
9. The Articles of Confederation brought in the rule that membership might be
transferred from one state to another. While there is here doubtless the original
expression of this character by the lawmaking body common to the new union, and
is perhaps a new quality in federations, yet there must be taken into account the
earlier common English citizenship of the great majority of the members of the
Confederation, and the common rights that it involved. Those, whether continued
or not throughout the preliminary states of their combination, must have done
much to render intercitizenship in the federation inevitable. In other words. if here
is a new character in federations, it is because this is a federation born out of condi-
tions to which the new character was fundamental.
F. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED SITS:
FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR TO 1861, at 15-16 (1906).
10. W. SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS
68-93 (D. Musch ed. 1979) (ann. reprint of 2 WHARTON'S STATE TRIAI.S 607-58).
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ever at his birth cannot be an alien to the king of England, cannot
be an alien to any of his subjects of England.""
Coke's reasoning applied to the colonists. Since they settled
pursuant to a royal patent, they remained royal subjects. Under
Calvin's Case, colonists could not be aliens under English law. That
meant, however, only that persons born outside of England who
were born subject to the King could still inherit property in Eng-
land under its common law.
Calvin's Case did not limit the discretion of the King in the exer-
cise of his prerogative or Parliament in the exercise of its power.
Both could discriminate among subjects on the basis of place of
birth. Indeed, early colonial trade laws did discriminate against
Scottish traders.' 2 Protection against such discrimination depended
upon a commitment by the body with power to act. Since the
Crown had authority to establish the laws in the colonies, colonists
looked to the King for a commitment against discriminatory treat-
ment when embarking upon the voyage to new lands.
B. Charter Guarantees
Charter provisions promised colonists the privileges, liberties,
franchises and immunities of Englishmen in any of the King's colo-
nies. Subsequently, the charter guarantees were used as a model for
the privileges and immunities clause.
The first English settlements in North America were commer-
cial ventures founded by individuals or companies operating under
a patent granted by the Crown. The grant was a feudal relic which
presumed foreign lands to be royal lands which the Crown could
bestow to others. Sir Humphrey Gilbert received a grant for com-
mercial activities in 1573, and Sir Walter Raleigh obtained a grant
in 1584. Neither established a successful colony, but the documents
supporting their efforts set the pattern for future charters.
In Gilbert's patent, Queen Elizabeth granted to every person
born within her allegiance and those properly under the patent "the
privileges of free denizens and persons native of England, and
within our allegiance, any law, custome or usage to the contrary
notwithstanding."' 3 The patent was an exercise of royal power: the
11. Id. at 90.
12. The acts of Union in 1707 by the parliaments of England and Scotland created the
United Kingdom of Great Britain, "thereby admitting the Scots to partnership in overseas
enterprises from which English policy had theretofore sought to exclude them." W. CRA'-
VEN, THE COLONIES IN TRANSITtON 1660-1713, at 313 (1968).
13. W. SWINDI I-R. supra note 10. at 61. The patent to Raleigh was similar: persons
[Vol. 37:794
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bestowed "privileges" were tied to the nature and scope of the
King's prerogative.' 4 The patent also gave Sir Humphrey the
power to create and to administer the law. The grant of "privi-
leges" to others implicated only limited civil rights, such as land
ownership, and not political rights. The assurance that colonists
would keep their English-law "privileges" encouraged emigration to
America. While France and Spain deemed their colonists beyond
the law because they were beyond the boundaries of the kingdom,
English colonists kept the "liberties, franchises, and immunities" of
the English at home.II
The first two colonies, Virginia and Massachusetts, were
founded by joint stock companies possessing a royal charter. The
Virginia Company charter provided:
[a]ll and every the Persons being our Subjects, which shall
dwell and inhabit within every or any the said several Colonies
and Plantations, and every of their children, which shall happen
to be born within any of the Limits and Precincts of the said
several Colonies and Plantations, shall HAVE and enjoy all Lib-
erties, Franchises, and Immunities, within any of our other Do-
minions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding
and born, within this our Realm of England, or any other of our
said Dominions.' 6
Maryland's proprietary grant contained a similar "privileges,
franchises and liberties" provision. 7 Indeed, virtually every col-
"shall and may have all the privileges of free Denizens, and persons native of England, and
within our allegiance in such like ample maner and fourme, as if they were borne and person-
ally resident within our said Realme of England, any lawe, custome, or usage to the contrary
notwithstanding." Id. at 65.
14. Denizens were aliens in England who were given special status by the King's pre-
rogative. The status enabled the denizen to purchase and own, but not inherit, lands in Eng-
land. Only Parliament could consent to a permanent transfer of real property to a person not
born subject to the English King. J. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 30-31. The reference to
denizens in this early patent as the measure of the privileges granted emphasizes the relation-
ship between "privileges" and the prerogative. Most of the later charters purported to mea-
sure "liberties, privileges, franchises or immunities" by those enjoyed by the English, without
reference to denizens.
15. These included trial by jury, benefit of clergy, and all the rights of possession
and inheritance of land as in England. The new lands in America were legally a
part of the king's demesne and were held as of a royal manor in England... in free
and common socage, thus making it clear that though the new colonies might be
outside the realm-as far as the payment of customs dues went and representation
in parliament was concerned-they were within the realm in all that pertained to
their legal and tenurial rights. Englishmen passing beyond the sea were Englishmen
still, with an Englishmen's safeguards and restrictions.
C. ANDREWS, 1 THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY 86 (1934).
16. 7 THORPE, supra note 8, at 3788 (citing Virginia Charter of 1606).
17. [L]ikewise all privileges, franchises and liberties of this our kingdom of Eng-
land, freely, quietly, and peaceably to have and possess, and the same may use and
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ony's charter provided that English subjects and their children who
lived in the colony be treated as Englishmen. 8 In most of the colo-
nies, the original proprietary grant or company charter was surren-
dered to the King, who governed through royal governors.
Colonists understood, however, that the "liberties, privileges,
franchises and immunities" of England continued to apply under
royal as well as proprietary or corporate governance.
These charter guarantees resemble the article IV provisions of
the Constitution.' 9 Each secures to persons related to a local area
enjoy in the same manner as our liege-men born, or to be born within our said
kingdom of England, without impediment, molestation, vexation, impeachment, or
grievance of US, or any of our heirs or successors; any statute, act, ordinance or
provision, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.
I LAWS OF MARYLAND 5 (V. Maxcy ed. 1811) [hereinafter LAWS] (citing Charter of
Maryland).
18. J. KETTNER, supra note 7, at 65. The Charter of New England stated
All and every the Persons, beinge our Subjects... shall have and enjoy all Liberties,
and Ffranchizes, and Immunities of free Denizens and naturall Subjects within any
of our other Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abidinge
and born within this our Kingdome of England, or any other our Dominions.
3 THORPE, supra note 8, at 1839.
The Connecticut Charter of 1662 secured all subjects born in the province "all Liberties
and Immunities of free and natural Subjects within any the Dominions of Us, Our Heirs or
Successors, to all Intents, Constructions and Purposes whatsoever, as if they and every of
them were born within the realm of England." 1 THORPE, supra note 8, at 533 (emphasis in
original).
Rhode Island's Charter in 1663 contained nearly identical language securing "all libertyes
and immunityes of ffree and naturall subjects within any the dominions of us ... to all
intents, constructions and purposes, whatsoever, as if they, and every of them, were borne
within the realme of England." 6 THORPE, supra note 8, at 3220.
North Carolina's Charter in 1663 was explicit in providing for rights of property for
persons born in that colony "'as likewise all liberties, franchises and priviledges of this our
kingdom of England, and of other our dominions aforesaid . . . as our liege people born
within the same." 5 THORPE, supra note 8, at 2747.
Georgia's 1732 Charter was closer to the original phrasing of Virginia. promising that all
persons born in the province "shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunities of
free denizens and natural born subjects, within any of our dominions. to all intents and pur-
poses as if abiding and born within this our kingdom of Great-Britain. or any other of our
dominion." 2 THORPE, supra note 8, at 773.
19. First, "our Subjects, which shall dwell and inhabit within every or any the said
several Colonies and Plantations," 7 THORPE, supra note 8, at 3788. is the charter equivalent
of article IV's "the citizens of each state." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Both phrases refer
to the people who lived in the colony and owed allegiance to the authority of that territory.
Second, the charter language "shall HAVE and enjoy all Liberties, Franchises and Immu-
nities," 7 THORPE, supra note 8, at 3788. parallels the art. IV phrase "shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities." U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 2. cl. 1. Charter guarantees used various
formulations for the guarantee, including "privileges." "liberties." "franchises." and "immu-
nities."
Third, "as if they had been abiding and born within this our realm of England." 7
THORPE, supra note 8. at 3788, is the colonial counterpart to the constitutional phrase "of
citizens." U.S. CONsr. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. Both phrases identify the standard for entitlement
[Vol. 37:794
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(state or colony) a set of rights ("privileges or immunities") to be
treated as a native throughout the territories (the several states or
the dominions). The parallel structure and linguistic similarity be-
tween charter guarantees and article IV demonstrates that the fram-
ers were influenced in their choice of language by the charter model.
The use of charter syntax indicates that the colonial charter experi-
ence had particular relevance to the article IV provisions.
C. Liberties, Franchises, Privileges and Immunities
The colonial charters never defined the "liberties," "franchises,"
"privileges," or "immunities" of persons born in England. These
terms gathered meaning from their medieval past and subsequent
events. The words originally denoted relief from feudal obligations.
At most, the charter guarantees promised that the King would not
overstep his prerogative within the royal demesne.
Developments in England and in the colonies led colonists to
attribute new meaning to the charter provisions. They argued that
the charters secured for the colonists the main features of the com-
mon law and the principles of English government. The colonists'
interpretation served colonial political interests and did not always
coincide with the British government's views. Ultimately, these
charter-provision disputes became an integral part of the Revolu-
tion. Although the colonial view of the charter provisions was his-
torically inaccurate, their interpretation was accepted by the
drafters of the privileges and immunities clause for the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution.
1. The Original Meaning of "'Liberties, " "Franchises,"
"Privileges" and "Immunities"
The charter provisions on "liberties, franchises and immunities"
may have had a limited technical meaning."0 In feudal times, land
was not individually owned but tenurially possessed in a hierarchi-
cal relationship of obligations owing all the way to the King."'
to privileges and immunities in terms of the most protected class within the political frame-
work: natives of England under English rule and citizens under the Constitution.
Finally, the charters secure these rights "'within any other of the king's dominions," 7
THORPE, supra note 8, at 3788, just as art. IV refers to enjoying them "in the several states."
U.S. CoNs-r. art IV, § 2, cl. 1.
20. "The words are to be taken literally, as meaning just what they were understood to
mean in England at that time. They have nothing to do with civil liberty, self-government, or
democracy; they were strictly legal, tenurial and financial in their application." C. AN-
DRFWS, supra note 15, at 86 n.1.
21. See generally F. MAITLAND, CONSTITUIrONAt. HisfrORY OF ENGLAND 23-39
1987]
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"Liberty" and "franchise" referred to specific relief from these obli-
gations-a surrender by the Crown to the subject of the royal power
to exact a burden. 2 The surrender could take the form of nonexer-
cise of the power or delegation of the power to another to exact the
obligation.
Early "privileges" involved the purchase of relief from a tax or
service obligation. By the end of the sixteenth century, feudalism
had ended in England,z3 and privileges from feudal burdens could
be generalized as privileges applicable to all persons in England.
Therefore, the charter references to the liberties of Englishmen may
have meant that the King's grant of rights to lands in America did
not entail feudal obligations.
The charter terms may have had a broader meaning if derived
from the corporate charters of English cities. There, "liberties" and
"franchises" referred to the powers of city government to levy tolls
or taxes or to protect inhabitants from being subject to obligations
such as jury duty beyond the city limits.2 4 The "liberties" of citi-
zens in town charters anteceded the more general grant of privileges
and immunities under the Magna Carta.25 In this more general
(1955) (discussing the feudal land system); H. BENNETT, LIFE ON THE ENGLISH MANOR: A
STUDY OF PEASANT CONDITIONS 1150-1400, at 97-150 (1960).
22. "Lastly, in our thirteenth century we learn that privileges and exceptional immuni-
ties are 'liberties' and 'franchises.' What is our definition of a liberty, a franchise? A portion
of royal power in the hands of a subject." F. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND
43 (1897).
23. Cf E. EGGLESTON, THE TRANSIT OF CIVILIZATION: FROM ENGLAND TO
AMERICA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 294, 312-13 n.18 (1959) (using 1700 as the date
ending feudal serfdom but admitting that authorities agree serfdom ended by 1450).
24. Know that we have granted and by our present charter have confirmed to our
burgesses of Ipswich our borough of Ipswich, with all its appurtenances and with all
its liberties and free customs, to be held of us and our heirs by them and their heirs
in hereditary right.
Charter to Ipswich from King John in 1200, reprinted in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, I
SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 96 (1972). The corporate charter was
originally a common form of town government. See H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND
PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW,
1730-1870, at 13-32 (1983). When commercial groups and explorers considered colonization,
the corporate charter was the most convenient model to set forth their operating conditions.
See J. SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 41-
42 (1950). The result mixed commercial company trading charters and self government as-
pects of town charters. Subsequent colonies under direct royal control continued to use doc-
uments akin to old corporate ideas.
25. The Magna Carta was originally issued to a small group of barons but reissued many
times by English kings subsequent to John. The class of those obtaining privileges under the
document broadened to include all Englishmen. The grants of privileges to towns in medie-
val times shifted individual grants of privilege to communal grants.
Besides this general debt to the doctrines underlying municipal privilege the men of
1215 could acknowledge many detailed precedents to their demands in the borough
[Vol. 37:794
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sense, the privileges, liberties, immunities, and freedoms might refer
to all limits of the Crown's power. If so, the character of the char-
ter guarantees was largely negative. The liberties, privileges,
franchises or immunities involved surrender rather than exercise of
royal power. They promised no legal protection to enforce rights
against others. That was to come from the separate grant of power
to the company or the proprietor to make laws approximating Eng-
lish law. Further, the charter guarantees offered no more protec-
tion from the prerogative than in England. When the first charters
were drafted, the Crown laid claim to extensive prerogative powers:
the King's power was at its height over his own lands, the King's
demesne, and dominions beyond the realm were considered the
King's demesne. The Virginia Company and New England char-
ters were issued by King James I, who maintained a broad view of
his power in England.26 In short, the first charter provisions repu-
diated feudalism or, at most, promised that the Crown would not
use its prerogative powers in the colonies to deprive subjects of life,
liberty or property in ways impermissible in England.
No grant from the King limited the power of parliament; "lib-
erties" were exemptions from royal power alone. Use of charter
language to support the later colonial claim that parliament could
not bind them was not based on original intent.
2. Privileges and Immunities from Colonization to Revolution
Developments in England and in the colonies during the century
and a half of British rule radically affected the meaning that colo-
nists gave to the charter guarantees. The seventeenth century was a
watershed in the struggle between the King and Parliament for legal
control.27 The King, controlling the judges and appointing execu-
charters of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. On mercantile questions this was
obvious. Cap. 41 of the Charter was an amplification of the very common provi-
sions in municipal charters concerning freedom to trade and free access to markets.
J.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 49 (1965).
26. James asserted a theoretical absolutism but relied on precedent for exercises of
power. See J.P. KENYON, THE STUART CONSTITUTION 1603-1688, at 8 (1946).
27. See H. NENNER, BY COLOUR OF LAW: LEGAL CULTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN ENGLAND 1660-1689, at ix-xii (1977).
It is unfortunate that an understanding of Stuart England is often confused by the
erroneous supposition that law and prerogative were opposed, that, at the beginning
of the century, law, in the person of Coke, is properly to be seen as the relentless
adversary of the prerogative, in the person of James I .... It can, however, be
argued that the seventeenth century makes greater sense, is rendered more intelligi-
ble, when the Stuarts and their parliaments are viewed in the context of a somewhat
different constitutional struggle, a struggle which was not for the ascendancy of law
but for the ascendancy of king or Parliament, and which was at all times circum-
scribed by law.
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tive officers, was initially victorious, but Parliament ultimately
gained control. Each advance of parliamentary power curbed royal
prerogative. Therefore, if privileges and immunities were defined by
limits on the prerogative, the privileges were expanded during the
seventeenth century.
Finding Parliament difficult to deal with, King Charles I at-
tempted to govern without it. The lack of finances forced the King
to find new expedients for raising revenues, such as the ship money
tax.28 The courts upheld this exercise of the prerogative,Z9but it was
insufficient. Forced to reconvene Parliament to obtain new reve-
nues, Charles I was compelled to accede to measures limiting the
prerogative, including one declaring the ship money levy illegal.3 °
The King could not impose taxes without parliamentary consent.
Though Charles I was eventually beheaded and Oliver Crom-
well ruled as Lord Protector, the struggle between King and Parlia-
ment continued throughout the century. Despite Charles I's
Restoration creating the possibility of extending prerogative pow-
ers, parliamentary supremacy was assured by the "Glorious
Revolution" of 1689 when William and Mary assumed the throne
after deposing James II.
The battle for legislative supremacy in England was paralleled
by the rise of local assemblies in colonial America. Each colony's
legislative authority was vested in the King's representative or
grantee. The corporate charters gave lawmaking power to the cor-
poration. The proprietary grant to Lord Baltimore gave him the
power to make laws "with the advice, assent and approbation of the
free-men of the same province, or of the same province, or of the
greater part of them, or of their delegates or deputies, whom WE
Id. at xi-xii.
28. Writ for the Collection of Ship Money (1634) in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM,
supra note 24, at 455-56, citing 2 HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS 257 (J. Rushworth ed. 1721).
The King could use his prerogative power over foreign affairs by demanding ships to equip
his foreign military ventures. Charles levied a tax rather than ships.
29. The Question of Ship Money (1637) in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, supra note
24, at 458-59, citing 3 STATE TRIALS 843 f (T.B. Howell ed. 1816-26) [hereinafter STATE
TRIALS]; and The King v. John Hampden (1638) in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, supra,
at 459-62, citing STATE TRIALS, supra, at 1089-145.
30. [T]he said charge imposed upon the subject for the providing and furnishing of
ships commonly called ship money .... and the said writs ... and the said judg-
ment given against the said John Hampden, were and are contrary to and against
the laws and statutes of this realm, the right of property, the liberty of the subjects,
former resolutions in parliament and the Petition of Right made in the third year of
the reign of his majesty that now is.
Act Abolishing Ship Money (1641), reprinted in C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, supra note
24, at 4811-12, citing 5 STATUTES OF THE REALM 116.
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will shall be called together for the framing of laws."3 Even royal
colonies included power in the governor and council to enact laws.
But government required cooperation by the populace, particularly
to support taxation. As early as 1650, the Maryland General As-
sembly contended that no tax could be raised without its consent.32
As a result of such insistence, grants of power to limited bodies to
enact local laws became anachronisms. Local assemblies made law
in most colonies by the end of the seventeenth century.3 3 The
Crown's power to control domestic colonial law was effectively re-
duced to the same veto power it retained over acts of Parliament.34
The autonomous local assembly transformed colonial views on
the meaning of the charter provisions securing the liberties of En-
glishmen. Early colonists asserted that "rights liberties immunities
priviledges and free customs" are created by English common and
statutory law, except as altered by the laws of the Province.35 Colo-
31. 1 LAWS, supra note 17, at 3.
32. noe Subsidies ayde Customes taxes or impositions shall hereafter bee layde as-
sessed, leavyed or imposed upon the freemen of this Province or on theire Merchan-
dize Goods or Chattles without the Consent and Approbation of the freemen of this
Province their Deputyes or the Major parte of them, first had and declared in a
Generall Assembly of this Province.
I ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND 302 (W. Browne ed. 1883).
33. M. KAMMEN, DEPUTYES & LIBERTIES: THE ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATIVE GOV-
ERNMENT IN COLONIAL AMERICA 57-58 (1969).
34. The King's or proprietor's colonial representative held a legislative veto power. The
Board of Trade, Lord's Committee and Privy Council all had power to review colonial legis-
lation, to disallow colonial laws and thereby to limit the power of local assemblies. See J.
SMITH, supra note 24; G. WASHBURNE, IMPERIAL CONTROL OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IN THE THIRTEEN AMERICAN COLONIES 1684-1776 (1923). The power was not
exercised against every departure from English practice, but laws which interfered with Eng-
lish colonial policy were inevitably stricken. The royal governor and the English Board of
Trade could veto an unwise although not conflicting law. In the eighteenth century, about
five percent of colonial laws were disallowed. J. BLUM, THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 50
(1968). See A. BASYE, THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF TRADE AND PLANTATIONS, 1748-
1782 (1925); 0. DICKERSON, AMERICAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT, 1699-1765 (1912); L.
LABOREE, ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA; A STUDY OF THE BRITISH COLONIAL SYS-
TEM BEFORE 1783 (1930); E. RUSSELL, REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY
THE KING IN COUNCIL (1915). In the eighteenth century, a permitted law could still be
appealed to the Privy Council as conflicting with English law. These appeals, although ex-
tremely rare, were precedents for the American judicial review doctrine. More commonly,
claims were made in American Courts of common law rights, and a limited class of such
cases could raise claims in the Privy Council that American court procedures violated rights
of Englishmen. See G. WASHBURNE, supra, at 184-89 (validity of colonial enactments dis-
cussed; Withrop v. Lechmere only case holding colonial enactment void; supplanted by Clark
v. Tousey).
35. A statute was proposed in the Maryland General Assembly in 1639, yet never
passed the house:
Be it Enacted By the Lord Proprietarie of this Province of and with the advice and
approbation of the freemen of the same that all the Inhabitants of this Province
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nial judges, appointed by the Crown or its local governors, turned
to English common law as a familiar source of precedent. Grants of
lawmaking power required some conformity to the common law.
Almost every governing document granted to the proprietor, cor-
poration, governor or council the power to make laws to govern the
settlers "so always as the said statutes, laws, and ordinances may be
as near as conveniently may be, agreeable to the form of the laws,
statutes government or policy of England. ' ' 36  While no one be-
lieved that English common law and parliamentary enactments
would categorically apply in America, the degree of their applicabil-
ity in the colonies was a complex issue.3 7 Nevertheless, English law
to some extent applied until altered by local authorities. The char-
ter language possibly guaranteed that the limits of the prerogative
would be bounded by the law: the requirement that the government
conform to English law created an expectation of the law's charac-
ter which became an assertible right. The charter language of indi-
vidual right used the words "privilege, franchise, liberties, or
immunities." Colonists understood those terms to incorporate Eng-
lish law.
being Christians (Slaves excepted) Shall have and enjoy all such rights liberties im-
munities privileages and free customs within this Province as any naturall born
subject of England hath or ought to have or enjoy in the realm of England by force
or vertue of the common law or Statute Law of England (saveing in such Cases as
the same are or may be altered or changed by the Laws and ordinances of this
Province).
And Shall not be imprisoned nor disseissed or dispossessed of their freehold
goods or Chattels or be out Lawed Exiled or otherwise destroyed fore judged or
punished then according to the Laws of this province saveing to the Lord
proprietarie and his heirs all his rights and prerogatives by reason of his domination
and Seigniory over this Province and the people of the same.
I ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 32, at 41.
The Secretary noted that a large number of bills, including this one, were never read nor
passed the house, without explanation for the failure. Nevertheless, the general Bill for the
Government of the Province that did pass in 1639 specified: "The Inhabitants of this Prov-
ince shall have all their rights and liberties according to the great Charter of England." Id. at
83.
36. W. SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 65-66.
37. The reception of the common law varied in territories acquired by conquering a
Christian king-where the existing law remained until replaced by positive exercises of the
prerogative-and territories acquired by conquest of an infidel-where the King's law was
immediately applicable. Acquisition of territory by settlement did not fit either category. J.
SMITH, supra note 24, at 467. Colonial judges looked to English common law but often
lacked legal training and access to English precedents. Local tailoring was unlikely to be
reviewed given the small number of cases reviewed by English courts. The applicability of
English statutes forced consideration of the type of parliamentary act (whether affirming
common law or making new law); the statutory scope (whether general or particular); the
date of enactment (whether prior to or after settlement); and the type of colony (proprietary,
charter, or royal).
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If the charter terms retained their meaning as limiting royal
power, the common law was not intrinsically a privilege or immu-
nity of a citizen but rather marked the prerogative's limit. If the
laws and ordinances of the colony departed from the common law,
such self government was no charter violation. Any threat to the
privileges or immunities of the colony's people came only if the
King or his grantee attempted to alter the common law by preroga-
tive. By the American Revolution, the colonists had asserted the
right to English statutory and common law appropriate for colonial
circumstances.
A selective "right" to desired laws without being bound by un-
desired ones originated in the negative character of "privileges and
immunities." English law defined the extent of the prerogative in
England and was thus a "privilege or immunity" of an Englishman.
The King's colonial prerogative was no greater than in England, but
the law applicable to colonists beyond the prerogative could be lo-
cally derived. Thus, only the English common law and statutes
found desirable by the colonists were colonial "privileges"; the rest
were locally defined.
England acknowledged that the colonists should be treated as
British subjects.38 As Parliament prevailed as the primary govern-
mental force, the right of British subjects was to have parliamentary
law apply through proper procedures. Colonists responded that lo-
cal assemblies in the colonies were the equivalent of Parliament.
Having identified charter guarantees with English law, the colonists
contended that the charters required conformity with the principles
of English government.39 They claimed that the nature of English
38. For the Crown, an interpretation of "privileges, liberties and immunities" as a grant
of government protection of individual rights supported the exercise of royal power over the
governance of the colony. At this early date, the Crown controlled foreign relations. The
rights and duties of English subjects in foreign lands came within the King's prerogative.
Thus, the clause could mean that the colonist was entitled to appeal to the King, not for any
specific legal right, but for protection like any Englishman in a foreign land. The King de-
cided what kind of protection should be afforded. See J. SMITH, supra note 24, at 42, 74-75,
140-45. This interpretation of the clause strengthened the King's claim to control the colo-
nial government. Even if the clause secured substantive legal rights to colonists, it provided
for royal supervision of colonial affairs.
39. This declaration [the liberties and immunities clause of the Connecticut char-
ter] and confirmation denotes and imports (as is conceived) that all those general
and essential rights which the free and natural subjects in the mother country are
possessed of and vested with by virtue of the main, leading, and fundamental princi-
ples of the common law or constitution of the realm, the King's subjects in the said
colony of Connecticut shall have and enjoy.
Fitch, Reasons Why the British Colonies In America Should Not Be Charged With Internal
Taxes (1764), reprinted in B. BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1750-
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subjects' rights was to be governed by their own representatives,
that Americans had no representation in Parliament, and that con-
sequently, laws made by Parliament for the colonies violated their
rights. Further, restrictive laws affecting the colonies differently
than England were challenged as violations of English liberties.
On May 30, 1765, the Virginia House of Burgesses claimed that
the Stamp Act violated the rights of Englishmen-rights both in-
herent in subjects of the King and granted specifically by charter.4
The "rights" claimed were limits on government. The nature of
"privileges and immunities" by now, however, had clearly changed
from limits on the prerogative to limits on any exercise of power by
any sector of English government.
On October 14, 1774, the First Continental Congress issued a
Declaration and Resolves that stated an even broader view of the
rights of Americans, claiming rights by the law of nature as well as
under the principles of the English Constitution and the colonial
1776, at 386, 390 (1965) (fundamental principle is that laws cannot be made or abrogated
without popular consent).
40. Resolved, That the first adventurers and settlers of this His Majesty's Colony
and Dominion of Virginia brought with them, and transmitted to their posterity,
and all other His Majesty's subjects since inhabiting in this His Majesty's said Col-
ony, all the liberties, privileges, franchises, and immunities that have at any time
been held, enjoyed, and possessed, by the people of Great Britain.
Resolved, That by two royal charters, granted by King James the First, the colo-
nists aforesaid are declared entitled to all liberties, privileges, and immunities of
denizens and natural subjects, to all intents and purposes, as if they have been abid-
ing and born within the realm of England.
Resolved, That the taxation of the people by themselves, or by persons chosen by
themselves to represent them, who can only know what taxes the people are able to
bear, or the easiest method of raising them, and must themselves be affected by
every tax laid on the people, is the only security against a burthensome taxation,
and the distinguishing characteristick of British freedom, without which the ancient
constitution cannot exist.
Resolved, That his Majesty's liege people of this his most ancient and loyal Col-
ony have without interruption enjoyed the inestimable right of being governed by
such laws, respecting their internal polity and taxation, as are derived from their
own consent, with the approbation of their sovereign, or his substitute; and that the
same hath never been forfeited or yielded up, but hath been constantly recognized
by the kings and people of Great Britain.
Resolved therefore, That the General Assembly of this Colony have the only and
sole exclusive right and power to lay taxes and impositions upon the inhabitants of
this Colony, and that every attempt to vest such power in any person or persons
whatsoever other than the General Assembly aforesaid has a manifest tendency to
destroy British as well as American freedom. ...
SOURCES & DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1764-1788 AND THE
FORMATION OF THE FEDERAL. CONSTITUTION 17-18 (S. Morison ed. 1929) [hereinafter
SOURCES] citilg JOURNALS OF THE HOUSE OF BURGESSES OF VIRGINIA, 1761-65 (J. Ken-
nedy ed. 1907) (last resolution rescinded although published in other colonies as though
passed).
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charters.4" In article 5 they claimed the right to the common law,
including trial by jury; in article 6 the Congress asserted the colo-
nists' right to the English statutes which they found applicable to
their own situation; and in article 7 they asserted the right to the
41. That the inhabitants of the English Colonies in North America, by the immuta-
ble laws of nature, the principles of the English Constitution, and the several char-
ters or compacts, have the following rights:
I. That they are entitled to life, liberty, and property, and they have never
ceded to any sovereign power whatever, a right to dispose of either without their
consent.
2. That our ancestors, who first settled these colonies, were at the time of their
emigration from the mother country, entitled to all the rights, liberties, and immu-
nities of free and natural-born subjects within the realm of England.
3. That by such emigration they by no means forfeited, surrendered, or lost
any of those rights, but that they were, and their descendants now are entitled to the
exercise and enjoyment of all such of them, as their local and other circumstances
enable them to exercise and enjoy.
4. That the foundation of English liberty, and of all free government, is a right
in the people to participate in their legislative council: and as the English colonists
are not represented, and from their local and other circumstances, cannot properly
be represented in the British Parliament, they are entitled to a free and exclusive
power of legislation in their several provincial legislatures, where their right of rep-
resentation can alone be preserved, in all cases of taxation and internal polity, sub-
ject only to the negative of their sovereign, in such manner as has been heretofore
used and accustomed. But, from the necessity of the case, and a regard to the
mutual interest of both countries, we cheerfully consent to the operation of such
Acts of the British Parliament, as are bona fide restrained to the regulation of our
external commerce, for the purpose of securing the commercial advantages of the
whole empire to the mother country, and the commercial benefits of its respective
members; excluding every idea of taxation, internal or external, for raising a reve-
nue on the subjects in America without their consent.
5. That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of England, and
more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of
the vicinage, according to the course of that law.
6. That they are entitled to the benefit of such of the English statutes, as ex-
isted at the time of their colonization; and which they have, by experience, respec-
tively found to be applicable to their several local and other circumstances.
7. That these, His Majesty's Colonies, are likewise entitled to all the immuni-
ties and privileges granted and confirmed to them by royal charters, or secured by
their several codes of provincial laws.
8. That they have a right to peaceably assemble, consider of their grievances,
and petition the king; and that all prosecutions, prohibitory proclamations, and
commitments for the same, are illegal.
9. That the keeping a standing army in these colonies, in times of peace, with-
out the consent of the legislature of that colony in which such army is kept, is
against law.
10. It is indispensably necessary to good government, and rendered essential
by the English Constitution, that the constituent branches of the legislature be ren-
dered independent of each other; that, therefore, the exercise of legislative power in
several colonies, by a council appointed during pleasure, by the Crown, is unconsti-
tutional, dangerous, and destructive to the freedom of American legislation.
All and each of which the aforesaid deputies, in behalf of themselves, and their
constituents, do claim, demand, and insist on, as their indubitable rights and liber-
ties; which cannot be legally taken from them, altered or abridged by ally power
whatever, without their own consent, by their representatives in their several pro-
vincial legislatures.
SOURCIFs, supra note 40, at 119-21.
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"privileges and immunities" granted by the charters or secured by
provincial codes. The separate article for "privileges and immuni-
ties" suggests that colonists still regarded the phrase as applicable
only to limits on government authority and not as establishing posi-
tive law as in the common law, the statutes or provincial codes.
Nevertheless, the Declaration indicates that the charter guarantees
merely confirmed rights applicable to the colonists from the princi-
ples of English government which in turn reflected natural law.
While they were still subjects of the King, the colonists rested their
claims primarily on rights identified within the existing English
legal system-the common law, the English statute, and the charter
provision or provincial code. Natural law was a supplementary ba-
sis for the claim of a "privilege or immunity" found in existing legal
structures.
On the eve of the American Revolution, the "liberties,"
"franchises," "privileges," and "immunities" in colonial charters
had developed new meanings. They were identified with the basic
principles the colonists found in English government, especially the
political principle of representative government.
D. The Rights of Englishmen in Other Dominions of the King
One of the basic principles of English government was the com-
mon status of all subjects of the King, confirmed in Calvin's Case.
There was little discussion in the polemical writings on the eve of
the Revolution of the rights of colonists in other dominions of the
King. That was not in contention. Nevertheless, the charter provi-
sions invoked to resist England had their clearest application to in-
tercolonial rights.
Historians have viewed the charter phrases as a reference to the
transportation of rights: colonists carry with them to the new world
and transmit to their children the same "privileges, franchises, lib-
erties and immunities" as had they remained in England.42 But the
crucial liberty claimed in 1776 was the right to be bound only by
laws to which the colonists had consented through their representa-
tive. The law varied from colony to colony; no one thought colo-
nists took the law of their colony with them when leaving its
jurisdiction. The early Virginia and Massachusetts charters re-
ferred to liberties as if the colonists had been "abiding and born
within this kingdom of England" but had added "or any other of
42. See, e.g., C. ANDREWS, supra note 15; A. HOWARD, THE ROAD FROM RUNNY-
MEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 15-23 (1968).
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our Dominions." Similar clauses in later charters made no refer-
ence to the privileges of persons abiding in England but only to
privileges or immunities as if born in England. These privileges
were secured not just in the province for which the charter was
given but in "any of our dominions." Consequently, this language
required the determination of the rights of an Englishman in the
other dominions of the King.
The content of the guarantees might be deduced from the rights
a colonist from one colony was actually afforded in a second colony.
Since the natives of the second colony presumably received their
charter liberties, the limits of the charter guarantee may be derived
from permissible discrimination against persons from other colo-
nies. Further, since the colonial charters and the privileges and im-
munities clause of both the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution specify that privileges and immunities apply across
boundary lines, the colonists relied on the experience of in-
tercolonial recognition of British nationality to understand their
rights. Curiously, few studies have traced the development of in-
tercolonial rights, yet this issue is important for understanding the
background of the Constitution.
1. Intercolonial Movement
Immigration from England and intercolonial migration oc-
curred throughout the colonial period. The common allegiance to
the King meant that the colonist could travel to England or other
colonies as freely as the English subject who lived in England. The
right to travel was an established English liberty since the Magna
Carta.43 Even the Navigation Acts of 1660 restricting American
trade treated colonial and English shipping alike, excluding only
alien ship trade.'
The English subject's right to travel, however, was restricted by
concern for religion, the protection of creditors, and the provision
of welfare. During early English settlement, a religious oath re-
quirement restricted emigration from England. Within the colo-
nies, local creditors feared servants and debtors would leave the
colony to escape their obligations. Even where individuals could
freely leave a community, they might be excluded from other com-
43. A. HOWARD, supra note 42, at 214. The Magna Carta guarantee protecting free-
dom of movement of foreign merchants became a similar guarantee for natives. J.C. HOLT,
supra note 25, at 11-12.
44. 7 STATUTES AT LARGE 452-60 (D. Pickering ed. 1763). An Act for the encouraging
and increasing of shipping and navigation. W. SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 116-24.
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munities for religious or poverty reasons. One important question
for investigation is the extent to which freedom of movement ex-
isted when the Revolution began.
The feudal system bound the serf to the lord's land. With the
demise of the feudal system, people could move around the English
countryside in search of work. English "poor laws," however, re-
quired an individual's parish to provide support until the individual
obtained "settlement" in another location.4 5 The power of local ju-
risdictions to return persons to the parish where they had settled
helped confine individuals to their birth area. Compared to feudal-
ism, there was considerable freedom of movement, but restrictions
continued to confine.
The Act of Settlement discouraged migration within England
but had a less significant impact on migration to the colonies. The
need for labor made the colonies eager to receive people rather than
to erect local barriers to avoid potential liability. The costs of trans-
atlantic travel assured that the passenger had money and would be
welcomed, or could fill needs for labor so that an indenture could be
made. The eagerness for new workers led to another movement re-
striction: some locations in England required registration of inden-
tures before the emigrant left the country as a means of
discouraging kidnapping.4 6
Once in the colonies, travel was restricted by various "pass
laws" adopted to prevent servants from escaping from service and
to enable masters to enforce the indenture term.4 7 Early laws re-
quired all persons who traveled to obtain a pass.4 These statutes
45. The Settlement Act of 1662 provided:
that any newcomer to a parish could be returned within 40 days to the parish where
he was last legally settled, whether or not he applied for relief or was likely to do so.
To avoid such expulsion, the individual could provide security or pay an exorbitant
rent (E10), far beyond the ability of most (90%) of the population. The result was
the legal restriction of all people without substantial wealth or property to the area
in which they were born.
P. DODYK, M. SOVERN, C. BERGER, W. YOUNG, & M. PAULSON, LAW AND POVERTY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 112 (1969).
46. D. GALENSON, WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA 183-84 (1981) (Bristol
registrations).
47. Id. at 8, citing A. SMITH, COLONISTS IN BONDAGE: WHITE SERVITUDE AND CON-
VICT LABOR IN AMERICA 1607-1776, at 264-70 (1947).
48. MARYLAND LAWS, 1715, Ch. XIX: "'An ACT prohibiting all masters of ships or
vessels, or any other person, from transporting or conveying away any person or persons out
of this province without passes." The original source for this law was MARYLAND LAWS,
1704, Ch. XXII (subsequent enactments, e.g. MARYLAND LAWS, 1753, Ch. IX, apply only to
servants and slaves).
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, SEPT. 1632, Act LVI: "It is ordered, That no person or persons shall
depart out of this colony to inhabite or abide within any other plantations, of New-England
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assured creditors that their debtors would not leave the province
without giving security to assure debt payment. Nevertheless, by
the middle of the eighteenth century, the colonial laws restricted
only those persons bound to service from emigration.
The colonial welcome for the indentured servant did not always
extend to that person beyond the term of indenture. The unem-
ployed and unemployable began to pose community problems. The
colonies, following England, adopted settlement laws for local juris-
dictions to exclude nonresidents in order to prevent welfare
claims.49 The statutes did not restrict travel but prevented indigents
from staying in a new town. The trader with resources was unaf-
fected by these laws which reflected community anxiety to avoid
welfare burdens for the poor.
Religious intolerance posed another restriction on travel. Dur-
ing religious strife in England, emigrants took an oath of loyalty to
the King before leaving England. The structure of the oath could
not conscientiously be followed by certain sects; therefore, religion
curbed English migration and limited immigration to the colonies.
Individuals not conforming to the dominant religion might be re-
fused settlement rights and driven from the area. The "poor" laws
and religious intolerance restrictions, while fencing people out, for
the most part did not prevent people from leaving. With so much
unsettled territory, a continued stream of migration flowed from
one colony to another, especially to the west.5 0
The Rhode Island charter in 1663 entitled inhabitants of Rhode
Island towns to free movement for lawful purposes through any
other of the king's dominions.51 Even without specific charter as-
surances, freedom of movement was common in practice. 2 Colo-
or elsewhere, unlesse he obteyne a lycense or passe for his departure under the Governor's
hand." See LAWS OF VIRGINIA, MARCH 1643, Act. II (prohibiting persons from transport-
ing persons from the colony without a pass and requiring the posting of security for debts as a
condition of getting the pass); LAWS OF VIRGINIA, MARCH 1657, Act XII (prohibiting mas-
ters of vessels from transporting any person out of the colony without a pass); LAWS OF
VIRGINIA, MARCH 1658, Act LXVIII (requiring a pass to be obtained to move to the Chesa-
peake Bay).
49. S. Mencher, POOR LAW TO POVERTY PROGRAM 39-41 (1967); W. TRAT-NER, A
HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN AMERICA 20-23 (3d ed. 1984).
50. On the heavy amount of emigration among freedmen in the Chesapeake, see Carr &
Menard, Immigration and Opportunity: The Freedman in Early Colonial Maryland, in THE
CHESAPEAKE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: ESSAYS ON ANGLO-AMERICAN SOCIETY
206, 236 (T. Tate & D. Ammerman eds. 1979) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE].
51. W. CRAVEN, supra note 12, at 54-55; See THORPE, supra note 8, at 3212-13.
52. See P. FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION 31 (1981). (Under British rule Ameri-
can colonists guaranteed freedom of movement by virtue of imperial citizenship.).
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nial law did not keep individuals in their home area unless fleeing
from a service obligation. Although the unemployed and unproper-
tied migrant might be excluded from living in new areas, the exclu-
sion related to the economic conditions of each area and was not
usually colony wide.
2. Acquisition of Citizenship by Residence
A second question for further study is the extent to which colo-
nists could acquire the rights of natives of another province by re-
siding there. To the British, the colonies were dependent
governments. A Virginia colonist was not a citizen of an independ-
ent state but an English subject inhabiting Virginia. Local assem-
blies could exercise delegated authority to proscribe local
community rules, but community membership was a consequence
of living there.
"Foreigners" were distinguished from British natives of other
colonies. New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Del-
aware excluded "foreigners" from voting by statute, and other colo-
nies customarily excluded non-British subjects.5 3
A number of provinces also established voting residence require-
ments although such laws did not exist in England. "In Georgia
and North Carolina, a six month minimum was established, in
South Carolina, one year, while in Pennsylvania and Delaware it
was two years."54 However, New York and Virginia had no resi-
dence requirement. An individual moving there from another prov-
ince immediately became a full community member entitled to vote
for the legislature if he met all the other voting requirements. 55
In some colonies, residence requirements excluded newcomers
from opportunities available to natives. As a native population de-
veloped, the colonists resisted the imposition of English officials.
The Crown retained the power to appoint colonial officials and gen-
erally reserved those positions as rewards for English supporters.
Concerned that outsiders would come to the colony to reap its prof-
its without becoming part of its life, colonists imposed durational
residency requirements for holding public offices. Local ordinances
excluded newcomers from offices except by immediate commission
from the Crown.56
53. R. DINKIN, VOTING IN PROVINCIAl. AMERICA: A STUDY OF ELECTIONS IN THE
THIRTEEN COLONws, 1689-1776, at 34 (1977).
54. Id. at 35.
55. Id.
56. XIX ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND, supra note 32, at 100-01; XXVI ARCHIVIES 01
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Other barriers to community membership existed for an immi-
grating nonresident. Community "poor laws" within a colony
could prevent an individual from settling there. The "poor law"
concept of settlement could create durational residency require-
ments for the exercise of other rights. Until a community accepted
an individual, real residence was not established. Acceptance into a
community was a local authority rather than colonial issue because
support obligations were local. One achieving "settlement" in an
area was entitled to civil and political rights available to long-time
residents.
Aside from these restrictions,57 the colonial concern focused on
inclusion rather than exclusion. Colonies encouraged immigration
by assuring foreigners of property and contract rights. They held
out the promise of colonial law naturalization, but England would
never accept colonial naturalization as being equivalent to parlia-
mentary naturalization. Under English law, an alien naturalized
under Massachusetts law was an alien and treated as one through-
out English dominions. Indeed, one of the charges against King
George in the Declaration of Independence was that "He has en-
deavored to prevent the population of these states; for that purpose
obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners; refusing to
pass others to encourage their migrations hither & raising the con-
ditions of new appropriations of lands."58
English law was concerned only with colonial attempts to natu-
ralize foreigners. Individuals born in England or a colony were not
naturalized because they were already English subjects. Thus,
although colonies enacted special naturalization procedures to as-
sure foreigners of rights held by natives, no such procedure applied
to the King's colonial subjects. The Crown wanted to facilitate ac-
ceptance. If colonists had restricted English immigration, England
would have disallowed their laws. Thus, in practice, a Virginian
became a New Yorker simply by moving there and waiting to be-
come a full community member.
MARYLAND, id. at 429-30. See also Jordan, Political Stability and the Emergence of a Native
Elite in Maryland, in CHESAPEAKE, supra note 50, at 243, 271-72; Shammas, English-Born
and Creole Elites in Turn-of-the-Century Virginia, in CHESAPEAKE, id. at 274, 291-92 (similar
Virginia laws).
57. Religious theocracy in New England during the seventeenth century also precluded
a stranger from becoming a true community member-a church member. It played a lesser
role in excluding residents during the eighteenth century as a more secular political structure
developed.
58. The Declaration of Independence para. 10 (U.S. 1776).
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3. Nondiscrimination against Nonresidents
The colonist was also protected against discrimination when vis-
iting or trading in a colony. The colonist who visited England or
had property interests there received the same legal treatment as
Englishmen. Unlike aliens, colonists retained rights to own real
property and to file suit in English courts. Hamilton wrote in The
Federalist Papers on the need for a single nation and cited the colo-
nial free trade to buttress his point. States in isolation would pursue
different commercial policies and cause:
distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget dis-
content. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal privi-
leges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest
settlement of the country would give a keener edge to those
causes of discontent than they would naturally have independent
of this circumstance.59
The English allegiance preventing the colonist from being
treated as an alien in other colonies did not prohibit laws distin-
guishing between residents and nonresidents. The nonresident
posed greater colonial control problems; consequently, legislation
dealt with the possibility that a nonresident would not remain in the
colony. Maryland had different rules for attachment of resident
and nonresident property.6" Residents were permitted to sue with-
out an attorney, while nonresidents were required to have one.6'
Special procedures were enacted for nonresidents to acknowledge
conveyances.62 These regulations were directed at locating and as-
serting jurisdiction over the nonresident and did not reflect antago-
nism toward the nonresident status.
An individual's right to treatment within another colony as a
common subject of the King did not prohibit all restrictive in-
tercolonial trade law. The Navigation Acts prevented colonists
from trading specified goods directly with foreign nations, requiring
goods to be shipped first to England. Colonies occasionally barred
importation of goods from other colonies. For example, in 1715
Maryland prohibited the importation of bread, beer, flour, malt,
wheat or other grain or tobacco from Pennsylvania or any other
59. THi- FI)ERAI 1ST No. 7. at 62-63 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (background
of intercolonial freedom of trade would make trade barriers established by separate states
difficult to tolerate: "We should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in
reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest." Id.).
60. MARYI AN) LAWS. 1715. ch. 40. § 2-3.
61. MARYILAN) LAWS. 1716. ch. 20.
62. MARY ANi) LxWS. 1776, ch. 14, § 4.
[Vol. 37:794
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
colony.6 3 Trade barriers assisted local producers at the expense of
other colonies, but the laws turned on the goods' location and not
the trader's residence. Colonial power to enact protectionist legisla-
tion was nonetheless limited, because England would not tolerate
commercial interference affecting its trade.64
II. THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
In the fourth article of the Confederation, it is declared "that the
free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and
fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the peo-
ple of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of
trade and commerce," etc. There is a confusion of language here
which is remarkable. Why the termsfree inhabitants are used in
one part of the article, free citizens in another, and people in an-
other; or what was meant by superadding to "all privileges and
immunities of free citizens," "all the privileges of trade and com-
merce," cannot easily be determined.65
Prior to declaring independence, each colony regarded itself as a
separate dominion headed by a common King. Under the various
charters, the King had promised colonial subjects entitlement to the
same liberties, privileges, franchises, and immunities in every other
colony as if born in England or that colony. As British subjects,
colonists had rights to travel, to become members of another colony
by moving there, and to be free of discrimination in trade, property
ownership and other legal rights in other colonies. However in-
dependent, colonial governments were required to recognize their
common link with other colonies through the King. Discrimination
against nonresidents paled in comparison to restrictions on foreign-
ers or to the past.
Independence broke the link with the King and undercut the
requirement that persons from other colonies be treated as common
subjects, not aliens. Unless some provision was made, each state
could discriminate freely against people from other states. Thus,
the privileges and immunities clause of the Articles of Confedera-
tion grew out of the need to restore the common nationality and
intercolonial rights that existed before independence.
63. THE LAWS OF THE PROVINCE OF MARYLAND 82-83 (E. Jones ed. 1718).
64. See C. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN RFvOLO.UTION
50 (1931).
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 270 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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A. Dickinson's Initial Proposal
During the move toward independence, the Continental Con-
gress established two committees: the first was to compile a state-
ment, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, explaining the reasons for the
breach with the mother country, and the second was to establish a
governmental framework. The latter committee reported a draft of
articles of confederation, largely by John Dickinson of Penn-
sylvania, on July 12, 1776. Dickinson proposed two articles to ad-
dress potential discrimination against citizens of other states:
Article VI: The Inhabitants of each Colony shall henceforth
always enjoy the same Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities
and Advantages, in the other Colonies, which the said Inhabit-
ants now have, in all Cases whatever, except in those provided
for by the next following Article.
Article VII: The Inhabitants of each Colony shall enjoy all
the Rights, Liberties, Privileges, Immunities and Advantages, in
Trade, Navigation and Commerce in any other Colony, and in
going to and from the same from and to any Part of the World,
which the Natives of such Colony enjoy. 6 6
Article VI on its face attempted to preserve the prerevolutionary
intercolonial privilege of the King's subjects under the new govern-
ment. Indeed, Dickinson used "inhabitants of each colony." Arti-
cle VII used a different mechanism to protect intercolonial rights of
movement and commerce. Instead of preserving the status quo, it
used the colonial charter technique of measuring intercolonial
rights by the rights of natives of the colony. Both provisions used
positive law standards without reference to natural law principles.
The August 1776 revised draft articles omitted both provi-
sions.67 No record of any discussion of the omission exists, but the
flaws of article VI may have been the cause. It prevented any alter-
ation of noncommercial state law affecting residents of other states,
even if nondiscriminatory against nonresidents. Article VII may
have been dropped because it was tied to Article VI as an exception.
The Dickinson draft raised the intercolonial rights issue under
Crown experience. The articles, although omitted, addressed a
state's obligations to persons from another state. The rejection of
the first draft's inartful approach simply postponed resolution.
B. Committee Draft Proposals
The Revolutionary War pushed aside the Articles of Confedera-
66. 5 JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 547 (W. Ford ed. 1906).
67. Id. at 676.
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tion consideration. A year later, the Continental Congress was still
debating it. In November 1777, with many delegates away, a com-
mittee considered new articles to be added to the draft. One article
elaborated on the Dickinson draft. Several forms of the proposed
committee article have survived.68 One early draft [hereinafter
Draft A] provided that:
5. And for the more certain preservation of friendship and
mutual intercourse between the people of the different States in
this Union, the Citizens of every State, going to reside in another
State, Shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges of the natu-
ral born free Citizens of the State to which they go to reside; and
the people of each State Shall have free egress and regress for
their persons and property to and from every other State, with-
out hinderance, molestation or imposition of any kind. Pro-
vided, that if Merchandize of any sort be imported for the
purposes of traffick within any State, that the person So import-
ing Shall be liable to the Same imposts and duties as the people of
the State are by law liable to where Such importations are made,
and none other. And provided also that the benefit of this Arti-
cle Shall extend to the property of the United States, and of any
particular State, in the Same manner as to the property of an
Individual in any State.
The first clause of this draft sets forth the privilege of becoming
a citizen of a second state by moving to it. The second clause
secures the right of free travel and residence. The broad protection
of movement is limited only by taxation of goods imported for trade
on the same basis that residents must pay.
The final committee draft also drew on another early draft
[hereinafter Draft B].69
And the better to secure and perpetuate mutual Friendship
and Intercourse between the People of the different States in this
Union, Agreed .. at The free Inhabitants of each of these
States, Paupers Vagabonds and fugitives excepted, shall be enti-
tled to all Priviledges and Immunities of free Citizens in all-and
every of said the respective States .... t, th. inhabitants of
the, respeetive States the Admission of their ownA inhabitan1ts and
the Sole Managemet of th. .. Aff.irs). And the
People of each State shall have free Ingress and Egress for their
Persons and Property to and from every other State, to trade and
traffick, without any Hindrance or Imposition of any Kind what-
soever, provided that if any Merchandise or Commodity be im-
ported into any State for the purpose of Traffick therein, the
Person so importing shall be liable to the same Imposts and Du-
68. 9 JOURNAlS, supra note 1, at 888 (W. Ford ed. 1907) (footnotes omitted).
69. Id. (Overstruck text indicates original draft deletion.)
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ties as the People of the State are by Law liable to where such
Importations are made and none other, provided also that the
Benefit of this Article shall Extend to the property of the United
States and of any particular State in the same Manner as to the
property of an Individual.
The sense of Draft B is less clear than Draft A. The first sen-
tence appears to assure inhabitants of one state the privileges and
immunities of free citizens in other states, whether to reside, trade
or visit. The exception for paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives sug-
gests that the drafters focused on the rights of persons attempting to
change residence, for members of these groups could be returned to
their place of origin. The deletion of the clause that reserved to
state inhabitants control over the admission of inhabitants and the
management of municipal affairs could signify the drafters' rejec-
tion of state power. More likely, the drafters' limit of the rights of
ingress and egress to travel for trade and traffic was designed to
allow states to exclude persons who wished to change residence or
to exercise non-trade or traffic rights. The draft secured citizenship
by change of residence for residents and secured the privileges and
immunities affiliated with trade and commerce for nonresidents.
The two drafts were merged by the Committee into a new draft
submitted to Congress:7
5. And [the better to secure and perpetuate mutual] friend-
ship and intercourse between the people of the different States in
this Union, the Inhabitants of every State [Paupers Vagabonds
and fugitives from Justice excepted] going to reside in another
State shall be entitled to all the rights and priviledges of the natu-
ral born free Citizens of the State to which they go to reside: And
the people of each State shall have free [Ingress and Egress] for
their persons and property to and from every other state without
hinderance, or imposition of any kind, Provided that if Merchan-
dise be imported [into any State] for purpose of trafficking
therein, the person so importing shall be liable to the same im-
posts and duties as the people of the State are by law liable to
where such importations are made, and none other, And pro-
vided also that the benefit of this article shall extend to the prop-
erty of the United States, and of any particular State, in the same
manner as to the property of an Individual.
This second draft article had the same clarity of Draft A that
the "rights and privileges" of "natural born free citizens" were se-
cured only for inhabitants of a state who went to a second state to
reside. However, the Draft A language had been too inclusive.
"Paupers, vagabonds and fugitives" were frequently forced under
70. Id. at 889. (Words in brackets show insertions by James Duane or Richard Law.)
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colonial laws to return to their place of origin. As persons subject
to expulsion, they were not entitled to the privileges and immunities
of free citizens. Thus, the committee adopted the Draft B exemp-
tion language. With the exclusion of paupers, vagabonds and fugi-
tives from the right to acquire citizenship in another state, most
serious state objections were eliminated.
The drafters left no reason for choosing "inhabitant" (Draft B)
rather than "citizen" (Draft A) to describe the protected class. "In-
habitant" may have conformed with the usage in earlier claims to
colonial privileges and immunities. For example, the claim of rights
as English subjects in the Declaration and Resolves of the First
Continental Congress was stated on behalf of the colonial "inhabit-
ants." Even Dickinson's 1776 draft articles used the term. The
prerevolutionary colonists considered themselves the King's colo-
nial subjects. They had not been colonial "citizens" in the same
manner that they later became United States "citizens," because co-
lonial naturalization powers were in debate with England. In early
independence, the more familiar term was used. Further, "free in-
habitants" and "citizen" may have been interchangeable because of
the peculiar revolutionary American situation. The colonists were
British subjects prior to 1776. With independence, colonists could
maintain their British nationality by leaving. The decision to re-
main in the states was considered an acceptance of the new govern-
ment's protection and created a bond of allegiance. State
citizenship was a choice of residence, not birth. Thus, "inhabitant"
and "citizen" were effectively coterminous.7'
Madison later chastized the use of "free inhabitants" in the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.
It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that
those who come under the denomination of free inhabitants of a
State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, in every
other State, to all the privileges of free citizens of the latter; that
is, to greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their own
state.72
Even if "inhabitant" and "citizen" were synonymous under the Ar-
ticles, the lack of a uniform naturalization power could lead to en-
abling aliens to acquire citizenship in one state in order to obtain
71. G. BANCROFT, 5 HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 200 (1883) cited
in F. FRANKLIN, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NATURALIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES 5 (1906).
72. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 270 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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the rights of citizenship in a second state where they would other-
wise be ineligible.
As Madison posited, the Articles of Confederation language
may have resulted from careless drafting through the reliance on
familiar terms, ignorant of the need for reexamination in a new con-
text. Alternatively, "inhabitant" may have been more limited than
"citizen" in this context. Its choice may have been designed to
eliminate the problem causing Madison to disparage article IV,
since it had been used earlier as synonymous with "subjects of the
King inhabiting the colony" and did not apply to alien residents or
other European persons whose colonial legislative naturalization
was not recognized in England.73 A decade after the revolution
when Madison wrote The Federalist, "inhabitant" had probably lost
its original common implication of a "British subject inhabiting the
colony;" inhabitants were no longer British subjects. On the other
hand, "citizen" reflected the political sense of self-government and
was now the more common usage.
The committee draft provided for the freedom of interstate
movement for all persons. Draft B had only protected interstate
movement "to trade and traffick" which limited the impact of a
broadly drafted privileges and immunities clause. The narrower
scope of the committee draft rights and privileges clause eliminated
the need to limit rights of interstate movement to commercial be-
havior. The apparent elimination of the right to exclude undesir-
able citizens of other states was acceptable because the most
undesirable persons were excepted.
The committee draft included the Draft A and Draft B provisos
permitting nondiscriminatory taxation of imported property and
conferred protection on state property equal to the protection for
property of individuals from other states.
C. Approval of Article IV by the Continental Congress
The Committee submitted its report on the new articles to Con-
gress for consideration on November 13, 1777. Congress approved
it after making a number of changes.74
Congress took into consideration the articles reported by the
committee as proper to be included in the confederation, and the
73. See J. KETTNER, supra note 7, on the refusal of British authorities to recognize
naturalization by colonial legislatures. The colony that conferred naturalization might be
able to treat the alien as a citizen within their boundaries, but no other colony was under a
similar obligation.
74. 9 JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 899.
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following were adopted: "And the better to secure and perpetu-
ate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the
different States in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these
states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted,
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in
the respective states; and the people of each state shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy
therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the
same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabitants
thereof respectively; provided that such restriction shall not ex-
tend so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into
any State to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant;
provided, also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction, shall be
laid by any State on the property of the United States, or either
of them."
This form of article IV of the Articles of Confederation differs
substantially from the committee form. No record of the discussion
for the changes exists. However, congressional behavior may be un-
derstood by comparing the new form with earlier drafts.
1. Clause 1: The Privileges and Immunities of Free Citizens.
[T]he free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the respective
states ....
In Congress the committee draft restored "free" before "inhabit-
ants" to clarify that a person bound to labor in one state would not
receive the rights of a "free citizen" in another. The distinction be-
tween "inhabitants" and "free inhabitants" also suggests an aware-
ness of the problems of slavery - slaves being excluded from the
rights of free citizens.
Congress also chose the Draft B wording in preference to the
committee report by specifying that the free inhabitants receive all
"privileges and immunities of free citizens" rather than all "rights
and privileges of natural born free citizens." Congress further pro-
vided that free inhabitants receive all privileges and immunities of
free citizens "in the respective states" and not just in the state where
they go to reside.
The committee draft prohibited states from interfering with per-
sons and property crossing state lines and secured residential citi-
zenship rights. It ignored the right to inherit property in another
state, one of the oldest of all intercolonial rights, traceable to Cal-
vin's Case. The extension of the protection of the first clause to free
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inhabitants "in the respective states" may have been intended to fill
that glaring gap.
The choice of "immunities" instead of "rights" in conjunction
with "privileges" may have indicated congressional intent to nar-
row the conferred protection. An expansion of the protected class
could reduce each member's protections. "Immunities" suggests
equal regulatory exemption treatment. "Rights" may include af-
firmative benefits such as voting or sharing in state resources. On
the other hand, the choice of "immunities" over "rights" may lack
significance. The original charter documents referred to "liberties,
franchises and immunities," while the colonial declarations against
the Stamp Act and other English laws claimed that charter "rights"
had been violated. This suggests that clear distinctions between the
terms were vanishing.
The elimination of "natural born" permits distinctions between
native born and naturalized state citizens to be perpetuated against
citizens of other states. Thus, voting and office-holding residence
requirements might be perpetuated.
2. Free Ingress and Regress to Other States.
... and the people of each state shall have free ingress and
regress to and from any other State ....
When Congress revised the committee version, it severed the
right of movement from property rights. The committee draft re-
stricted a state's power to protect its own interests. The previous
draft references to free ingress and egress of person and property
"without hinderance, molestation or imposition of any kind" liter-
ally prohibited states from excluding diseased or other undesirable
property from other states. The earlier drafts only permitted non-
discriminatory imposts and duties. Congress saw that states needed
greater power over property from other states but did not wish to
give states greater power over interstate travel.
3. The Privileges of Trade and Commerce.
... and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and com-
merce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as
the inhabitants thereof respectively ....
The congressional revision permitted states to regulate nonresi-
dents engaging in trade and commerce to the same extent that it
regulated its own inhabitants. Trade barriers and prohibitions were
allowed when based on the goods' nature or source of origin rather
than on the residence of the person intending to import them.
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Madison was perplexed, however, over the need to have a separate
clause for the privileges of trade. "[W]hat was meant by super-
adding to 'all privileges and immunities of free citizens,' 'all the
privileges of trade and commerce,' cannot be readily determined."75
Several alternatives may account for the separation of the trade
and commerce privilege from the privileges of free citizens.7 6 Lin-
guistically, the best explanation is that the level of protection af-
forded trade and commerce was different from that afforded other
privileges and immunities of citizens. The state's power to treat
nonresidents in virtually any nondiscriminating way was modified
by a limited guarantee for nonresidents to remove property from the
state despite any state restriction on its own citizens.
4. Proviso for the Removal of Imported Property.
... provided that such restriction shall not extend so far as to
prevent the removal of property imported into any State to any
other State of which the owner is an inhabitant ....
The congressional revision acknowledged a state interest in
preventing importation by permitting states to regulate trade of per-
sons from out of state with restrictions applicable to state residents.
The nondiscrimination policy dealt inadequately with the state's
power to prevent exports. Import control protects against harm
from such property, but export control serves to retain the benefit of
the property within the state. This interest was acceptable for natu-
ral resources or even property that originated in a state, but not
where the property did not originate in the state and where the
owner was not a state inhabitant. If a state could forbid the re-
moval of property brought into the state by a nonresident, the non-
resident might be discouraged from entering the state with property
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 270 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
76. One alternative would find that the privileges and immunities of citizenship are con-
fined to participation in self-government and are separate from privileges of trade and com-
merce. This is unlikely, because Dickinson's draft clearly considered the separate provision
for trade and commerce privileges in his article VII to be an exception from the general
protection for privileges in article VI. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
A second alternative is to join Madison in charging the drafters with sloppiness. The
separate trade privileges clause could have been a relic of the early drafts which conferred all
privileges and immunities of citizens only on persons coming to another state to reside there
and had to provide separately for privileges afforded nonresidents who merely wished to do
business without establishing a new residence. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
A third possibility is that the Congressional revision was not intended to extend the privi-
leges and immunities clause benefit beyond persons seeking new residence. This would entitle
free inhabitants of a state "to the privileges and immunities of free citizens in the respective
states" [by moving to other states].
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to trade. A law forbidding removal of any property brought into
the state would affect persons who reside in the state differently
than those who reside elsewhere. This different impact may have
inspired the clause in the article IV congressional revision prevent-
ing nondiscriminatory restrictions on "the removal of property, im-
ported into any State, to any other state of which the owner is an
inhabitant." The new clause may have also protected the slave-
owner traveling to another state. Slavery was not yet illegal in any
of the states, but abolition was beginning to be discussed.
5. Intergovernmental Immunities.
... provided, also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction,
shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States, or
either of them.
Each of the earlier article IV drafts protected the interstate
movement of property from restrictions except for the same imposts
and duties imposed on residents. This property immunity was ex-
tended to state and United States property.77 The revision of the
article to expand state power on imports led Congress to reconsider
the impact of that expansion on interstate relations when applied to
the property of other states or the United States. The regulation
and taxation of a sovereign entity would have been a source of fric-
tion. The revised article eliminated the problem by granting a total
governmental property immunity.
D. The Adoption of Article IV
A committee of three-Mr. Richard Henry Lee, Mr. Duane,
and Mr. Lovell-was appointed "to revise and arrange the articles
of confederation agreed to; and to prepare a circular letter to the
respective states to accompany the said articles."78 The Committee
77. "And provided also that the benefit of this Article Shall extend to the property of
the United States, and of any particular State, in the Same manner as to the property of an
Individual in any State." See 9 JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 888. [Draft A].
"Provided also that the Benefit of this Article shall Extend to the property of the United
States and of any particular State in the same Manner as to the property of an Individual."
See id. [Draft B].
"And provided also that the benefit of this article shall extend to the property of the
United States, and of any particular State, in the same manner as to the property of an
Individual." See id. at 889. [Committee Report].
78. See 9 JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 900. Their revised version was as follows:
ART.4. The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse
among the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of
these states, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be enti-
tled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the
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changed only two words of article IV, substituting "among" for
"between" in the preamble and "several" for "respective" in the
text. The Committee also revised capitalization and punctuation.
The article was adopted in that form by the Continental Congress
on November 15, 1777 for circulation to the states.
North Carolina delegate, Thomas Burke, recorded his thoughts
on the Articles of Confederation privileges and immunities clause.
Burke was exceptionally wary of the provisions threatening state
sovereignty. The Continental Congress adopted Articles of Confed-
eration article II at his motion that: "Each state retains its sover-
eignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction
and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to
the United States, in Congress assembled." However, Burke left
Congress a month before the proposal of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause and had no special knowledge of its meaning when he
commented on it:
The Constitution of No. Carolina permits not the Privilege of
Citizens to any who have not resided therein 12 months, and
paid Taxes. 79 (local protection is given to all within the Terri-
tory) the Legislature therefore cannot ratify an artikle which
gives such priviliges to persons residing in other States. Our
Commons are voted for by all free Citizens, and if the Inhabit-
ants of our Neighboring States have the priviliges of Citizens in
ours they might insist upon the right of voting for Members of
Our Legislature which would be a political absurdity. It seems
therefore proper that this article should be Amended by adding
after the clause refer'd to- not inconsistant with their respective
Constitutions:
80
Burke's suggestion would have rendered the article ineffective,
because any state could subsequently discriminate against nonresi-
dents by amending its constitution.8" His comments present a seri-
people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State,
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same
duties, impositions and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively; pro-
vided, that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of
property, imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner is an
inhabitant; provided also, that no imposition, duties, or restriction, shall be laid by
any State on the property of the United States, or either of them.
9 JOURNALS, supra note I, at 908-09.
79. "That every foreigner, who comes to settle in this State, having first taken an'oath of
allegiance to the same, may purchase, or, by other just means, acquire, hold, and transfer
land, or other real estate; and after one year's residence, shall be deemed a free citizen." N.C.
CONST. of 1776, art. XL, reprinted in W. SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 407.
80. 2 LETTERS OF THE MEMiiERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 552 (E. Burnett
ed. 1921-36) [hereinafter LETTERS].
81. The state constitutions had been adopted by simple vote in the state legislatures.
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ous problem if his understanding of the article's effect was correct.
The possibility of nonresidents voting for state officials was unac-
ceptable. Eliminating the voting residence requirement would have
offended a number of states. Since no state suggested changing the
article to respond to this problem, Burke's interpretation of the
clause was probably not accepted.
The clause was most likely intended to embody the colonial
right to be free from discrimination.82 Discrimination on the basis
of residence permitted under the charters would not violate the
clause. Thus, the privileges and immunities of free citizens would
include rights to sue, rights to own property, and rights to be free of
discriminatory regulation-but would not afford nonresidents
rights to vote or hold political office.
Burke had one more objection to the proposed article IV:
The Provisionary clause of this article, in my opinion, deprives
the States of every power to increase or regulate their particular
Commerce, Agriculture or Manufactures. They cannot prevent
by Duties or restrictions importations, or Exportations Injurious
to any of them. This surely is what no staple state ought to ad-
mit, and that of all ours, who has so many Staples. 83
Burke's objection is that the "proviso" that restrictions on trade
and commerce privileges "shall not extend so far as to prevent the
removal of property, imported into any State, to any other State of
which the owner is inhabitant" deprives states of the power to pre-
vent "importations or exportations injurious to any of them." He
assumes that a state cannot prevent imports by its citizens because
restrictions on trade cannot prevent property removal to any other
state which the owner inhabits. This construction overlooks the
grammatical placement of the proviso. It is an exception only to
82. There are many other alternative readings. First, the privileges and immunities of
citizens might not refer to voting, which could be viewed as an affirmative right rather than a
privilege or immunity limiting government power. On the other hand, the political back-
ground which identified the phrase with the colonial claim for self-government suggests that
Burke was correct in believing that the privileges and immunities of citizens include voting, at
least in the negative sense that laws should not bind persons unless represented in the law-
making body.
Second, the deletion of reference to "natural born" free citizens supports the view that
durational residence requirements for privileges are permissible. This theory also poses diffi-
culties. While durational residence requirements existed in the political sphere for voting and
office holding, they would not seem tolerable with respect to other civil rights such as prop-
erty ownership or rights to bring suit.
Third, the entitlement to the privileges of citizenship might require changing residence to
obtain benefits. The omission of the express references to residence changes casts doubt on
this interpretation.
83. LETTERS, supra note 80, at 552.
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state power to enact nondiscriminatory restrictions over trade and
commerce of persons of another state. It does not apply to state
power over its own inhabitants. On its face, the proviso only pre-
vents states from barring nonresidents from taking out of the state
any property that was brought into the state from elsewhere. While
a state could not prevent a nonresident who has brought goods into
the state from elsewhere from taking those goods to a home state, a
prohibition on natural resource exportation would be valid because
those goods were not imported into any state. Similarly, a prohibi-
tion on the importation of any goods would be valid, because the
proviso only protects nonresident exportation of goods they import
lawfully.
In June 1778, when Congress asked the states to report on Arti-
cles of Confederation ratification, few states had ratified them with-
out comment, and a number of state representatives had offered
amendments. Every outside proposal was heard, considered, and
rejected. The rejection of the proposed changes may have been in-
fluenced by the fear that any change would compel each state to
reconsider the Articles of Confederation de novo causing greater de-
lay in ratification. Nevertheless, the proposals for change show the
Articles' perceived problems. On June 22, 1778, the Maryland dele-
gates proposed that "paupers" be omitted and that "that one state
shall not be burthened with the maintenance of the poor who may
remove into it from any of the others in the Union" be added.84
The issue that led to the exclusion of paupers from article IV pro-
tections was confronted directly in a separate substantive provision.
The effect of the proposed new clause would make it unnecessary to
separately exclude paupers and would have confirmed the worthi-
ness of individuals who happened to be paupers without endanger-
ing the social welfare structure.
On June 25, 1778, the South Carolina delegates offered their
amendments: 85
The delegates from South Carolina, being called on, moved
the following amendments in behalf of their state:
1. In article fourth, between the words "free inhabitants,"
insert "white."
Passed in the negative. Two ayes, eight noes, one divided.
2. In the next line after the words "these states," insert
"those who refuse to take up arms in defence of the
confederacy."
84. 11 JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 631 (W. Ford ed. 1908).
85. Id. at 652-53.
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Passed in the negative. Three ayes, eight noes.
3. After the words "several states," insert "according to the
law of such states respectively for the government of their own
free white inhabitants."
Passed in the negative. Two ayes, eight noes, one divided.
4. After the words "of which the owner is an inhabitant,"
insert "except in such cases of embargo."
Passed in the negative. Two ayes, eight noes, one divided.
South Carolina was concerned with article IV's impact on free
blacks. The first and third proposals expressly excluded free blacks
from the article's benefits and from being used as a basis to measure
the rights to which citizens of other states would be entitled. The
rejection of these two proposals may have reflected a desire to pre-
vent discrimination against free blacks, or it could have been pre-
mised on an agreement to disagree on whether blacks came within
the historic understanding of "inhabitants." 6
South Carolina's second proposal excluded Tories from citizen-
ship privileges but also affected conscientious objectors like the
Quakers. 7 The rejection of this proposal likely reflected the ac-
knowledged state power to treat such persons as badly as it treated
its own citizens who refused to bear arms. While paupers,
vagabonds, and fugitives were undesirable characters, persons who
had a temporary political disagreement were not so clearly danger-
ous to the state.
South Carolina's fourth proposal for amending article IV per-
mitted a state to prevent the removal of property by a nonresident
to a home state in cases of embargo. Here the exception could swal-
low the rule permitting nonresidents to remove imported property.
86. According to D. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMiERICAN
POLITICS, 1765-1820, at 153-54 (1971), this amendment was rejected because the
delegates were in a hurry to finish the Articles, and not for any major substantive
reasons. If haste was indeed the reason for not including the word white and thus
explicitly limiting comity to "free white inhabitants," then South Carolina and
other Deep South states may have felt no obligation, under the Articles or the Con-
stitution, to grant comity to free blacks from other states. The understanding that
"free inhabitants" in the Articles applied only to whites may very well have carried
over into the more broadly worded provision for comity in the Constitution.
P. FINKELMAN, supra note 52, at 31-32 n.36.
87. Georgia made a similar proposal. Georgia had suggested in its ratification order
that after "vagabond" should be added "all persons who refuse to bear arms in defense of the
State to which they belong, and all persons who have been or shall be attained of high treason
in any of the United States." 11 JOURNAlS, supra note 1. at 671. The delegate from Georgia
had not received instructions when asked by Congress on June 25 to report. but indicated
that the state would ratify as the document stood. Id. at 656. Thus. the amendments recom-
mended by the state, which also included adding the words "white inhabitants" to article IV.
were not presented to the Continental Congress.
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It also raised the specter of embargoes of different dimensions
promulgated by each state to the confusion of foreign relations.
On June 26, 1778, the Continental Congress adopted the Arti-
cles of Confederation, effective as soon as ratified by all of the states.
However, Maryland held out, and it was not until 1781 that every
state ratified the Articles. A committee was then appointed to re-
port on the effect of the Articles of Confederation. August 22,
1781, the comrlittee responded with some diffidence: 88
The Committee appointed to prepare an Exposition of the
Confederation, a plan for its complete execution and supplemen-
tal articles report.
That they ought to be discharged from the exposition of the
Confederation because such a comment would be voluminous if
coextensive with the subject, the omission to enumerate any Con-
gressional powers become an argument against their existence,
and it will be early enough to insist upon them, when they shall
be exercised and disputed.
They further report that the Confederation requires execu-
tion in the following manner...
2 By describing the privileges and immunities to which the
citizens of one State are entitled in another.
The Continental Congress never determined the privileges and
immunities to which citizens of one state were entitled to in an-
other. The Articles of Confederation failed to create a viable en-
forcement mechanism. No federal court existed to interpret the
document, and the article IV ambiguities remained unresolved
although article IV was, in theory, binding on the states.
Despite uncertainty, one function of article IV of the Articles of
Confederation remained clear: it prohibited states from imposing
any restriction not applicable to residents on nonresidents engaged
in trade or commerce. Without federal enforcement, however, this
command was breached with impunity during the pre-Constitution
period. When the state delegates convened and proposed a new
Constitution, they considered the problem of article IV violations
occurring without redress. Madison noted in his Preface to Debates
in the Convention of 1787 that:
The same want of a general power over Commerce, led to an
exercise of the power separately, by the States, which not only
proved abortive, but engendered rival, conflicting and angry reg-
ulations .... In sundry instances as of N.Y., N.J., Pa & Md the
88. 21 JOURNALS, supra note 1, at 894.
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navigation laws treated the Citizens8 9 other States as aliens. 90
III. THE CONSTITUTION
Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several states.91
Under the Articles of Confederation, each person was a citizen
only of the state of permanent residence. States had obligations to
citizens of other states and to the other states themselves, but the
state was always a mediating body between the individual and Con-
gress. The Constitution changed this relationship. It gave Congress
direct power to legislate over individuals. The direct relationship
between individual and national government transformed citizen-
ship in the United States. For example, article I gave Congress the
power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization."92 Federal
legislature qualifications included requirements that the legislator
be a "Citizen of the United States."9 3 The role once played by the
King in uniting the colonies under a single citizenship was now
played by the national government.
The convention did not consider the privileges and immunities
clause until the national character of the new government had been
established. The Virginia delegation opened the Constitutional
Convention by presenting a set of resolutions stating principles for
an essentially national government. Charles Pinckney of South
Carolina presented a plan that slightly altered the Articles of Con-
federation. Pinckney's plan was referred to committee and never
discussed on the convention floor. It was used later, however, by
the Committee on Detail.94 After some weeks of discussing the Vir-
ginia plan principles, William Paterson of New Jersey presented an
89. In this edition, the editor noted that the word "of" is inserted in the transcript after
"Citizens."
90. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 14.
Pennsylvania established a form for registering resident-owned ships. 1778 PENN-
SYLVANIA LAWS Ch. LXXX § 7 (THE FIRST LAWS OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENN-
SYLVANIA, J. Cushing ed. 1984). New Jersey did so in its navigation act, 1781 NEW JERSEY
LAWS CH. CCXCIII § 6 (THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEw JI'RSEY, J. Cushing ed.
1981). Maryland provided for ship registration in 1784 MARY.AND LAWS Ch. LXXIX
(THE FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND, J. Cushing ed. 1981). Maryland ships
were taxed at six pence per ton while all other ships were taxed at one shilling per ton at
entrance or clearance. Id. § 21. Taxes were also laid on specified goods with a deduction of
one sixth for vessels built and navigated by Maryland residents. Id. at Ch. LXXIV. § 16.
91. NOTES OF- DEBATIES, supra note 3, at 625; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3. at 601.
92. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 4.
93. U.S. CONSTr. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3.
94. NoTEs OF DiEBAIEs, supra note 3, at 33 n.36.
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alternative proposal more closely conforming to the Articles of
Confederation. Madison opposed the New Jersey plan on June 19,
1787, and raised the issue of the Confederation's impotency to en-
force its provisions. He argued that the New Jersey plan suffered
from the same infirmity.
3. Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other? Of
these enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virg.a
& Maryland which give9" a preference to their own Citizens in
cases where the Citizens of other States are entitled to equality of
privileges by the Articles of Confederation. 96
Although the notes of Madison's speech do not specify the state
statutes that ostensibly violated the Articles of Confederation, he
probably referred to reductions for state citizens on duties owed by
ships using the state ports.97 Those preferences led Maryland and
Virginia to enact a compact anticipating the wider meeting in An-
napolis and finally the convention itself.98
The conflict between large and small states, reflected in the rival
plans at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, was resolved
by a compromise that left the states with two votes each in the Sen-
ate and with House representation based on population. With some
basic principles resolved, comprehensive document drafting was re-
95. The editor of NOTES OF DEBATES notes that the word "gave" is substituted in the
transcript for "give."
96. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 143.
97. MARYLAND LAWS, 1784, Ch. LXXXIV, § XVI:
And, to encourage the building of merchant vessels within this state, and to navi-
gate them by citizens of this or some of the United States, Be it enacted, That on
imports in any vessel built within this state, and navigated by a master, citizen of
this state, and by mariners, one half of whom are citizens of this or some one of the
United States, and one half of the property of such vessel actually belongs to some
one or more of the citizens of this state, there shall be a deduction from the duties
imposed by this act on enumerated articles, one sixth part thereof, and from the two
percent duty on non-enumerated articles, there shall be a deduction of one eighth
part thereof, and if reducted to one per cent there shall be a deduction of one fourth
part thereof; and on exports in any such vessel, navigated and owned as aforesaid,
there shall be a deduction of one third part of the duty imposed by this act; and on
imports in any vessel built within this state, and entirely owned by citizens thereof,
and wholly navigated by a master and mariners, all of whom are citizens of this
state, there shall be a deduction from the duties imposed by this act on enumerated
articles, of one third part thereof, and from the two per cent duty, a deduction of
one fourth part thereof, and if reduced to one cent a deduction of one half part
thereof; and on exports in any such vessel, there shall be a deduction of one half
part of the duty imposed by this act.
LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1783, ch. XXXVIII [11 Henings Statutes at Large 289], § III:
Provided always, That no ship or other vessel, belonging to any citizen or citizens of
this commonwealth, and no ship or other vessel, under the burthen of sixty tons,
belonging to any citizen or citizens of the state of Maryland, shall be subject to the
duty on tonnage.
98. See 12 HENING'S STATUTES AT LARGE 50, LAWS OF VIRGINIA, 1785 ch. XVII.
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ferred to a Committee of Detail. The committee was to bring to-
gether the principles adopted by the convention with articles not in
dispute. The committee draft of August 1787 introduced the privi-
leges and immunities clause to the Convention.
The free (inhabs) Citizens of each State shall be intitled to all
Privileges & Immunities of free Citizens in the sevl States.99
In the August 6, Committee of Detail report, "(inhabs)" was
dropped and "free" omitted. Madison subsequently argued in The
Federalist that "inhabitants" in the privileges and immunities clause
suggested that an alien resident of one state could achieve the rights
of a citizen in other states. "Citizen" avoided this possibility.
Under the Articles, the biggest problem in conferring privileges and
immunities on citizens of other states had been any one state's abil-
ity to naturalize foreigners on conditions unacceptable in other
states. The new Constitution conferred on Congress the uniform
power of naturalization."° Thus, the Committee of Detail report
specified that "the citizens" of each state be entitled to the privileges
and immunities of citizens.
"Free" modified "inhabitants" to prevent slaves from being
given rights. However, this term was unnecessary when "citizen"
was used, because slaves were not citizens. There was no reason to
deny indentured servants (if any remained after the Revolution had
disrupted any lingering indenture pattern) the rights granted to citi-
zens (including bound citizens).
The Committee of Detail report also eliminated "free" in the
measure of rights afforded citizens of a state. They were only enti-
tled to the privileges and immunities afforded "citizens" in contrast
to "free citizens." This change may have encouraged omission of
the exception clause for "paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from jus-
tice," who could be bound or imprisoned according to the law ap-
plicable to residents. That law may have sufficiently protected state
interests.
99. 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 173-74. Pinckney claimed to have introduced this
clause into the Constitution. See Appendix A, CCCXXXVIII; 3 RECORDS, supra note 3, at
445-46.
This clause was in the last of the series of documents found among the Wilson Papers in
the Library of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Farrand numbered the document IX
and noted: "Found among the Wilson Papers, and in Wilson's handwriting, but with emen-
dations in Rutledge's hand. Parts in parentheses were crossed out in the original; italics
represent additions by Wilson; emendations by Rutledge are in angle brackets < >.'" 2
RECORDS, supra note 3, at 163 n.17. The section on privileges and immunities was part of a
longer section enclosed in angle brackets, written by Rutledge.
100. THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 271 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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Sixty-five years later, the Supreme Court discussed whether the
word "citizen" included free blacks. Chief Justice Taney argued
that "citizen" excludes "every description of persons ... not fully
recognized as citizens in the several states." Consequently, he con-
tended that free blacks were not citizens."' 1 Justice Curtis pointed
to the defeat of the South Carolina amendments to the Articles to
demonstrate that free blacks were entitled to the privileges and im-
munities of citizens under the Articles. He argued that nothing in
the Constitution suggests that it deprived anyone of citizenship;
thus, free blacks who were citizens under the Articles are citizens
under the Constitution. Nothing in the Constitutional Convention
debates indicates that thought was given to the status of free
blacks. 102
One mystery in the new article is why the Committee of Detail
used only the privileges and immunities clause and did not include
the separate Articles of Confederation provisions dealing with inter-
state travel and the privileges of trade and commerce.
The Constitution conferred powers on Congress that did not ex-
ist under the Articles. Congress had the power to regulate com-
merce among the several states. 103 It could decide whether
individuals' rights to remove property imported into one state to
101. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 419 (1857).
102. In 1821, Charles Pinckney spoke in Congress on the admission of Missouri. He
claimed that he proposed article IV, § 2. He stated that:
at the time I drew that constitution, I perfectly knew that there did not then exist
such a thing in the Union as a black or colored citizen, nor could I then have
conceived it possible such a thing could have ever existed in it; nor, notwithstanding
all that has been said on the subject, do I now believe one does exist in it.
3 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 446.
No accurate copy of Pinckney's proposal exists. Farrand constructed a sketch based on
several sources. The exact language of article IV which Pinckney proposed is also lost. Far-
rand includes the relevant portion from observations Pinckney prepared as a speech to ac-
company his draft:
The 4th article ... is formed exactly upon the principles of the 4th article of the
present confederation, except with this difference, that the demand of the Executive
of a State for any fugitive criminal offender shall be complied with. It is now con-
fined to treason, felony, or other high misdemeanor.
Id. at 606-07.
Pinckney's proposals were referred to the Committee of Detail with all other proposals,
but he was not on the Committee which reported out the final form. 2 RECORDS, supra note
3, at 97-98. Pinckney may not have influenced the final form of the article nor engaged in any
discussion at the Convention over its meaning. His views on black citizenship three decades
later had little if any relevance to the understanding of the convention or the ratifying
conventions.
103. Being in the same terms with the power over foreign commerce, the same ex-
tent, if taken literally, would belong to it. Yet it is very certain that it grew out of
the abuse of the power by the importing States in taxing the non-importing, and was
intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States
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their state of residence should be protected. Congressional power
was a more flexible tool than the Articles' ban on such state laws.
With the removal of that proviso from the Articles, however, there
was no longer any reason to distinguish between the privileges and
immunities of citizens generally and the privileges of trade and
commerce. Thus Madison, writing in The Federalist, saw no need
for a separate trade privileges clause.
The elimination of the clause providing for "free ingress and
egress to and from any other state" is more difficult to explain. Pro-
fessor Chafee wrote that, "[t]he reason for not expressly giving 'free
ingress and regress' across state lines must be that it is in the Consti-
tution, somewhere else. But where?"" He apparently finds it later
in the commerce clause reinforced by the due process clause."°5
The Framers may have considered it implicit in article IV. Since
the privileges and immunities clause grants a citizen rights in an-
other state, any attempt by the origin or destination state to prevent
interstate travel would deny the individual those rights.
Finally, the Committee of Detail report omitted the exception
for paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice contained in arti-
cle IV of the Articles of Confederation. The exception for fugitives
had probably been redundant, because both the Constitution and
the Articles provided for the extradition of fugitives to the state
charging them with a crime. The Constitution extended the extra-
dition clause to persons charged with any crime, not just treason,
felony or high misdemeanors. Thus, fugitives could never claim all
privileges and immunities of citizens under the Constitution, be-
cause they were always subject to extradition.
The pauper, on the other hand, raised unique questions. Consti-
tutional national citizenship would break down part of the reluc-
tance to acknowledge as citizens paupers moving into the state.
themselves, rather than as a power to be used for the positive purposes of the Gen-
eral Government, in which alone, however, the remedial power could be lodged.
Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829). 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS OF JAMES MADISON 14-15, reprinted in 3 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 478.
104. Z. CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 185
(1956).
105. Id. at 192-93. Chafee dismisses article IV as a source for the right of interstate travel
because the Court had not used that clause. He also indicated that the use of article IV as the
basis of the right would be too restricting. He reasoned that article IV forbids only nondis-
crimination and concluded that a state could exclude nonresidents by prohibiting its own
residents from returning if they left the state for a period of time. His hypothetical need not
lead to that result. Article IV specifies that a citizen is entitled to all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several states. If the nonresident is entitled to the privilege of a citizen in
another state, any barrier to return is irrelevant.
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Further, the obligation of support for the poor was local; therefore,
the refusal to permit an individual to settle in a particular local area
to prevent the imposition of a community burden would be com-
mon to persons within and without the state. The right to cross
state borders might thus be protected by article IV, but the right to
reside in a particular community within a state was unprotected.
The paupers and vagabonds exception-as well as that for fugi-
tives-may have been unnecessary to preserve the state's right to
deal with the problems they posed.
On August 6, the Committee of Detail report was submitted to
the Convention. The privileges and immunities clause was pro-
posed as a separate article, numbered XIV.
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states. 06
The clause received little debate at the Convention. One propo-
sal required a period of citizenship before individuals would be eligi-
ble to serve in the national legislature. On August 13, Pennsylvania
delegates objected that the requirement conflicted with their consti-
tutional provision granting foreigners all the rights of citizens after
two years' residence. Wilson argued that foreigners who came to
Pennsylvania had been promised full participation and that the
adoption of such a restriction would be a breach of faith.
M' GOV' MORRIS moved to add to the end of the section
[art IV. S. 2] a proviso that the limitation of seven years should
not affect the rights of any person now a Citizen ....
M" WILSON read the clause in the Constitution of Pen' giv-
ing to foreigners after two years residence all the rights whatso-
ever of citizens, combined it with the article of Confederation
making the Citizens of one State Citizens of all, inferred the obli-
gation Pen' was under to maintain the faith thus pledged to her
citizens of foreign birth, and the just complaints which her fail-
ure would authorize. 10 7
The discussion suggests that citizenship rights included candi-
dacy and perhaps voting. The convention was concerned with the
106. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 394; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 187.
107. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 439, 441; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 270,
272. The Pennsylvania Constitution provided in § 42 that
Every foreigner of good character who comes to settle in this state, having first
taken an oath or affirmation of allegiance to the same, may purchase, or by other
just means acquire, hold, and transfer land or other real estate; and after one year's
residence, shall be deemed a free denizen thereof, and entitled to all the rights of a
natural born subject of this state, except that he shall not be capable of being elected
a representative until after two years residence.
8 PA. CONST. of 1776, § 42, reprinted in W. SWINDLER, supra note 10, at 284.
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merits of the citizenship requirement, but no one responded to the
Pennsylvania delegate's concern over vested rights. Perhaps the ar-
gument was too obvious to voice. Pennsylvania citizens were not
deprived by the proposed Constitution of any rights which they
presently had. Prior to the Constitution, there was no real national
government. The potential for new Pennsylvania citizens to be se-
lected as a delegate to the Continental Congress was not compara-
ble to the position of representative in Congress after adoption of
the Constitution. They would continue to be afforded the privileges
and immunities of citizenship in other states secured by the
Articles.
On August 28, 1787, the Convention considered the privileges
and immunities clause, numbered article XIV.
A" XIV was taken up.
Ge"' PINKNEY was not satisfied with it. He seemed to wish
some provision should be included in favor of property in slaves.
On the question on Art: XIV.
N.H. ay. Mas ay. C' ay. N.J. ay. P' ay. Del ay. Md ay. Va
ay. N.C. ay. S.C. no. Geo divided.10 8
Madison's notes are unclear about General Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney's thoughts on amending the clause. He may have sought
assurances that slaveowners could bring their slaves into other
states without risking loss.'" 9 The privileges and immunities clause
of the Articles had specifically provided that the owners of property
imported into a state could remove it to the state where they reside.
That Article was drafted before abolitionism seriously threatened
slave property, but by 1787 Pinckney may have seen that the pro-
viso protected rights in slaves while in transit. Madison's failure to
appreciate Pinckney's views may relate to his inability to under-
108. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 545; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 443. Far-
rand appears to have erred later, for at 577 he cites the privileges and immunities clause as
voted on prior to the work of the Committee on Style as "[t]he citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States." This is inconsistent
with his description of the clause coming from the Committee on Detail and with his footnote
to the text at 443. If, however, his listing at 577 is accurate, the substitution of "in" would
have taken place in the Committee on Style. See id. at 443 n.28, 577 (emphasis supplied).
109. It is likely that Pinckney was concerned with slave movement and masters in
transit when he raised the objection. Throughout the convention the proslavery
representatives had been adamant about protecting their property. It seems odd,
therefore, not that Pinckney made the suggestion, but that it was not pursued.
Three likely explanations may be offered. Pinckney may have felt the problem too
remote or insignificant to worry about; he may have felt it would be impossible to
win concessions on this point and chose discretion over valor; finally, he may have
been convinced by his colleagues or upon reconsideration that precedent and the
existing clause offered enough protection to slave property.
P. FINKELMAN, supra note 7, at 35 (footnotes omitted).
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stand why the Articles separated trade and commerce privileges
from the other privileges and immunities of citizenship.
Pinckney's concern may have been to assure that other states
would recognize the slaveowners' property rights to slaves in their
home state.1 10 Thus, the very next article discussed at the Conven-
tion referred to any person charged with treason, felony, or high
misdemeanor in any state who flees from justice. Pierce Butler and
Charles Pinckney moved "to require fugitive slaves to be delivered
up like criminals." 11' Although he withdrew the August 28 motion
to permit voting on the article, Butler renewed it on August 29
with more carefully considered language. It was unanimously
accepted. 1
2
George Mason of Virginia made the following notes on his draft
copy of September 12:113
Section 2nd, Article 4th-The citizens of one State having an
estate in another, have not secured to them the right of removing
their property as in the 4th Article of the Confederation-amend
by adding the following clause: and every citizen having an estate
in two or more States shall have a right to remove his property
from one State to another. (not proposed)
Mason did not make this omission a ground for his opposition to
the Constitution. Either he considered the absence of restrictions
on the states an insignificant flaw or the grant of power over inter-
state commerce to be adequate to secure removal of property where
appropriate.
On September 12, 1787, the Committee on Style reported out
the Constitution. They renumbered the privileges and immunities
clause but made no other changes.
IV... Sect. 2. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all
110. Because Pinckney raised his objection when article XIV was debated (rather
than at the time of the debate on the Fugitives from Justice article), it seems that he
was not referring to fugitive slaves. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that
the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Articles of Confederation specifically
protected property "imported into any State, to be removed to any other States of
which the owner is an inhabitant." Slaves in transit would of course have been an
important type of property protected by this clause. It seems fair to assume that
Pinckney wanted that property protected in the Constitution.
Id. at 35 n.44.
11. NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 545.
112. Mr. Butler moved to insert after art: XV. "If any person bound to service or
labor in any of the U. States shall escape into another State, he or she shall not be
discharged from such service or labor, in consequence of any regulations subsisting
in the State to which they escape, but shall be delivered up to the person justly
claiming their service or labor," which was agreed to nem: con:
NOTES OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 552.
113. 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 636-37.
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privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.114
On September 15, 1787, the Convention voted to adopt the Con-
stitution as amended and on September 17 voted to adopt it as
enrolled. " 5
The absence of serious debate over the privileges and immunities
clause indicates that it was not innovative. Taken from the Articles
of Confederation, it had supplied the interstate links missing when
independence was declared. It gave content to United States citi-
zenship. As the Supreme Court has noted, "[T]he provision was
carried over into the comity article of the Constitution in briefer
form but with no change of substance or intent, unless it was to
strengthen the force of the Clause in fashioning a single nation."
' 16
IV. RATIFICATION
[I]n order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privi-
leges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be
entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in
which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its
citizens.' 17
The article IV privileges and immunities clause drew virtually
no attention in the debates on Constitutional ratification. Because it
was so clearly drawn from the Articles of Confederation, those who
favored rejection of the Constitution in favor of the Articles could
raise no principled objection. Madison and Hamilton mention the
clause in The Federalist as support for other propositions. The pro-
vision for a uniform system of naturalization eliminated the cau-
tionary need to identify citizens of a state entitled to privileges and
immunities. The Constitution omitted state power to exclude spe-
cific classes of undesirables. The other portions of the Articles of
Confederation clause which balanced state powers over nonresi-
dents were moot when citizenship came from the federal govern-
ment. Indeed Madison's only reference to the privileges and
immunities clause in The Federalist argued that the provision for a
uniform system of naturalization cured the major defect of the Arti-
cles and that the language of article IV was better than that of the
Articles. '
114. NoTEs OF DEBATES, supra note 3, at 625; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 601.
115. NOTES OF DEBATES. supra note 3, at 652, 655; 2 RECORDS, supra note 3, at 633,
644.
116. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 661 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
117. THE FEDERAlST No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
118. In the fourth article of the Confederation, it is declared "'that thefree inhabit-
ants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice excepted,
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Hamilton focused more directly on the privileges and immuni-
ties clause in The Federalist. His purpose was to justify the grant of
federal jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases; but rather than
discuss the substance of the clause, he focused on the procedure for
enforcing it." 9 In short, the clause engendered no controversy
leading to a discussion illuminating its scope until long after it had
been adopted.
V. THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORY TO INTERPRETIVE ISSUES
Disputes in interpretation of the privileges and immunities
clause have proliferated in the two centuries since its adoption.
Partisans of a variety of conflicting interpretations could often draw
on historical data for support. Ultimately, the issues must be re-
solved in a context broader than that of framers' intent, but, for
many, questions of meaning cannot be satisfactorily resolved with-
out a connection to intent at some level of generality.
A. Natural Law
One of the earliest judicial opinions considering the privileges
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities offree citizens in the several States;
and the people of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and
commerce," etc. There is a confusion of language here which is remarkable. Why
the termsfree inhabitants are used in one part of the article,free citizens in another,
and people in another; or what was meant by superadding to "all privileges and
immunities of free citizens," "'all the privileges of trade and commerce," cannot
easily be determined .... What would have been the consequence if such persons,
by residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of
another State, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizen-
ship, within the State proscribing them. Whatever the legal consequences might
have been, other consequences would probably have resulted of too serious a nature
not to be provided against. The new Constitution has accordingly, with great pro-
priety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding from the defect of
the Confederation on this head, by authorizing the general government to establish
a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States.
THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 269-71 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
119. It may be esteemed the basis of the Union that "the citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.-
And if it be a just principle that every government ought to possess the means of
executing its own provisions bj' its own authority it will follow that in order to the
inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the
citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all
cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens.
To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and sub-
terfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal
which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the differ-
ent States and their citizens and which, owing its official existence to the Union, will
never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principle on which it is founded.
THE FEDERA.IST No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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and immunities clause of article IV identified them with fundamen-
tal natural law rights.
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from
the time of their becoming free, independent and sovereign. 120
This view of article IV as a constitutional source for the protection
of fundamental rights was stated in political arguments, and was
applied by Chief Justice Taney as a basis for denying citizenship to
blacks in Dred Scott v. Sanford.12 '
The language of the article can be read to grant specific rights to
the individual, rather than simply protecting against discrimination.
"The privileges and immunities" to which citizens of each state are
entitled are those of "citizens in the several states." Although this
may be interpreted as a reference to the privileges granted a citizen
in each state separately, it literally can bear the meaning of privi-
leges so fundamental that they exist in all of the states. 122
Professor Antieau argued that the fundamental rights interpre-
tation of the privileges and immunities clause explains the separa-
tion of the clauses on privileges and immunities of citizens and
privileges and immunities of trade in the Articles of Confederation.
The former, he maintained, applies to fundamental natural rights
while the clause on trade applied only to prevent discrimination
based on residence. It was the former, he noted, that was used in
the Constitution. 23
Finally, the charter clauses which foreshadowed the constitu-
tional provision were identified by 1774 with the natural rights of
man. The pamphleteers of independence had abstracted from Eng-
lish law its "fundamental principles" as the privileges and immuni-
ties to which the colonists were entitled. The next logical step in
this process of abstraction would be to identify the fundamental
principles of English law as the fundamental rights of all citizens.
The Declaration of Independence shifted colonial claims from the
120. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1823).
121. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See Bogen, The Transformation of the Fourteenth
Amendment: Reflections from the Admission of Maryland's First Black Lawyers, 44 MD. L.
REV. 939 (1985).
122. See Antieau, Paul's Perverted Privileges or the True leaning of the Privileges and
hnmunities Clause of Article Four, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 5 (1967).
123. Id. at 3.
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fights of Englishmen to the natural fights of man, and logically
could have influenced the drafters of the Articles and the Constitu-
tion to include a clause protecting such fundamental rights.
1 24
This array of arguments proved persuasive to a generation con-
fronted with the moral breakdown of society represented by slavery.
Slavery was constitutional, but contrary to fundamental principles
of natural law. The symbolic honor and integrity of the Constitu-
tion could be saved by identifying it with fundamental rights. This
the framers of the fourteenth amendment attempted to do in the
privileges and immunities clause of that amendment. The argu-
ments for a fundamental fight interpretation are far less compelling
to a modern generation more skeptical of the ability of anyone,
much less a court, to define fundamental fights in a generally satis-
factory manner.
The linguistic arguments for natural fights interpretation of arti-
cle IV ignore the drafting history of the clause. That history shows
the privileges and immunities were to be based on those found in
each state separately, rather than an abstraction common to all
states. The committee that proposed the privileges and immunities
clause of article IV of the Articles of Confederation specified that
the privileges to which inhabitants of every state were entitled were
"the fights and privileges of the natural born free Citizens of the
State to which they go to reside." Only the right to travel was
stated as an independent substantive right not based on the princi-
ple of nondiscrimination. Congressional revision removed the limi-
tation of the privileges and immunities clause to persons going to
reside in another state, but retained the sense that the privileges and
immunities to which the citizens of each state are entitled are those
that citizens receive in the states to which they travel. The congres-
sional revision referred to the "privileges and immunities of free cit-
izens in the respective states" which clearly envisions serial
privileges and immunities that differ from state to state. The ulti-
mate change of the Committee on Style for the Articles, replacing
"respective" with the word "several" bears no hint of a change in
meaning.
Antieau's contention that the distinction between privileges of
citizens and privileges of trade in the drafting of the Articles re-
124. But see J. REID, The Irrelevance of the Declaration, LAW IN THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION AND THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN LAW 46 (Hartog, ed. 1981). Reid ar-
gues that natural law was not a significant element in the Declaration. To the extent this is
true, it becomes even more unlikely that the privileges and immunities clause had reference to
natural law.
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flected the distinction between fundamental rights and protection
against discrimination also fails on analysis. Dickinson's draft used
the standard of existing rights rather than fundamental rights. The
later committee on amendments severed the clauses to restrict the
general privileges and immunities clause application to persons
changing residence. The separation of the clauses in the congres-
sional revision does not appear to work a sudden change in the prin-
ciple of all the earlier drafts which measured privileges and
immunities by what existed for residents of the state in question.
Finally, the historic identification of colonial charter provisions
of the liberties of Englishmen with fundamental principles of natu-
ral law was based on the proposition that the rights that existed as
positive law in England could be independently determined to be
principles of natural law. Thus, natural law was not the source of
the rights, it merely happened to coincide with the principles of
government of Great Britain. When the colonists rested their
claims to independence on natural rights in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence, they chose language of "inalienable rights" and not the
historically bound charter phrases of privilege, liberties, franchises
or immunities. Thus, there is no basis for believing that the term
"privileges and immunities" had altered its meaning from a refer-
ence to rights based on existing law to a natural law framework.
The "fundamental right" vision of the "privileges and immuni-
ties" clause of article IV is, more importantly, inconsistent with the
structure and history of the document. The purpose of the clause,
stated in the Articles of Confederation, was "the better to secure
and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people
of the different states in this Union." This suggests that preventing
parochialism was more important than individual rights. Article IV
in the Articles of Confederation is the only provision in the docu-
ment using language of individual rights. The limited guarantee to
individuals that states would not discriminate on the basis of state
residence is a reasonable provision for federalism, but a national
right to have a state afford each individual fundamental rights is
inconsistent with the jealousy for state sovereignty manifested in the
Articles.
In the Constitution, the privileges and immunities clause is a
part of an article that deals almost exclusively with problems of fed-
eralism rather than individual rights. 125 It does provide a right for
125. Note, The Interstate Privileges and Immunities: Fundamental Rights or Federalism,
15 CAP. U. L. REv. 493, 499-50 (1986).
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the individual, but the context demonstrates the rights are granted
to promote interstate harmony rather than from concern for the
individual. The link Hamilton made in The Federalist between the
protection of the privileges and immunities clause and diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction in article III supports this view. In the con-
text of justifying the grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal courts,
Hamilton wrote:
To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against
all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction
should be committed to that tribunal which, having no local at-
tachments, will be likely to be impartial between the different
States and their citizens and which, owing its official existence to
the Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the
principles on which it is founded. 126
In Hamilton's view, then, the clause confers rights only on the
citizen of one state with respect to privileges and immunities af-
forded him in another state. Thus, Hamilton may also be cited in
support of the proposition that the clause secures only equality with
residents.
The Court agrees that article IV protects against discrimination
and does not establish natural law rights.
It has come to be the settled view that Article IV, § 2, does
not import that a citizen of one State carries with him into an-
other fundamental privileges and immunities which come to him
necessarily by the mere fact of his citizenship in the State first
mentioned, but, on the contrary, that in any State every citizen of
any other State is to have the same privileges and immunities
which the citizens of that State enjoy. The section, in effect, pre-
vents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States
in favor of its own. 127
The history of the clause suggests that article IV is more than a
mere prohibition against discrimination affecting nonresidents. It
also is the source of a right to travel and a right to establish resi-
dence and become a citizen in a new state without being subjected
to unwarranted residence requirements. In the years to come it will
play an increasingly vital role in constitutional litigation.
B. The Right to Travel
In a concurring opinion in Zobel v. Williams,128 Justice
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 478 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
127. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939), cited in Baldwin v. Montana Fish &
Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 382 (1978).
128. 457 U.S. 55, 71 (1982).
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O'Connor argued that the right to travel is based on the article IV
privileges and immunities clause. "[A]pplication of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause to controversies involving the 'right to
travel' would at least begin the task of reuniting this elusive right
with the constitutional principles it embodies."' 2 9
Justice O'Connor noted the right of free ingress and egress in
article IV of the Articles of Confederation. Based on Pinckney's
comment that article IV of the Constitution was based on the prin-
ciples of the Articles, she argued that it included the right to travel
and that the omission of the express provision was to prevent redun-
dancy. O'Connor then recited early case law supporting article IV
as the source for the right to interstate travel.
In Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1823),
(No. 3,230) for example, Justice Washington explained that the
Clause protects the "right of a citizen of one state to pass
through, or to reside in any other state." Similarly, in Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall., at 180, the Court found that one of the "un-
doubt[ed]" effects of the Clause was to give "the citizens of each
State... the right of free ingress into other States, and egress
from them." See also Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430
(1871). Finally, in United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 297-
298 (1920), the Court found that the Clause fused two distinct
concepts: (1) "the right of citizens of the States to reside peace-
fully in, and to have free ingress into and egress from" their own
States, and (2) the right to exercise the same privileges in other
States. 30
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Zobel, in which Justices
Blackmun, Marshall, and Powell joined, rejected O'Connor's views.
"I note that the frequent attempts to assign the right to travel to
some textual source in the Constitution seem to me to have proved
both inconclusive and unnecessary."'' He stated that the right
may equally plausibly be found in the commerce clause or privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment. "In any
event, in light of the unquestioned historic recognition of the princi-
ple of free interstate migration, and of its role in the development of
the Nation, we need not feel impelled 'to ascribe the source of this
right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional
provision.' ,132
Justice Brennan's nonchalance over the source of the right to
travel may reflect his view that there are implicit constitutional
129. Id. at 81.
130. Id. at 80.
131. Id. at 66.
132. Id. at 67 (citation omitted).
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rights derived from basic values of human dignity and responsibility
which do not require specific textual justification. The "right to pri-
vacy," including the choice of whether to abort a fetus as set forth
in Roe v. Wade '33 and subsequent cases, appears to be such a right.
The strongest supporters of Roe on the Court have been the strong-
est opponents of O'Connor's attempt to root the right to travel in
the text of the Constitution. If Roe is to survive, however, it should
be justified on its own unique merits, for the right to travel has
strong historical and textual support within the language of the
document.
Justice O'Connor apparently reasoned that the right to enter
and to leave a state was a privilege or immunity of citizenship. The
subject in colonial times was privileged to go anywhere within the
dominions of the king, a right specifically protected by the Articles
of Confederation and, therefore, a privilege of citizenship when the
Constitution was adopted.
The right is also implicit in the text. Article IV states that the
citizen in one state is entitled to the privileges and immunities of
citizens in another state. If the state of origin prohibits leaving, it
will prevent a citizen from obtaining article IV privileges. Simi-
larly, if the state of destination excludes the citizen, it also obstructs
obtaining the privileges. In Crandall v. Nevada,'34 Justice Miller
deduced the right to travel from the citizen's right to obtain access
to federal offices in states other than one's own. The same mode of
reasoning applied to article IV demonstrates that citizens have a
right to travel across state lines to obtain the treatment to which
they are entitled. 135
With history and text supporting an article IV right to travel,
the court nonetheless rejected that clause. In Crandall v. Nevada,
Nevada imposed a dollar tax on anyone leaving the state by com-
mercial carrier. The tax did not discriminate between citizens of
Nevada and citizens of other states. It was collected by the carrier
133. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
135. The argument is not foolproof. A counter argument is that citizens are entitled to
the privileges in another state only if they can get there. This position assumes that the clause
is directed at state behavior with regard to persons who have traveled to it, preventing dis-
crimination within a state, and is not concerned with whether an individual may enter or
leave the state. The right to enter or leave a state would then depend upon the rules applica-
ble to the state residents. This counterargument fits the language of the clause as well as the
argument of the text, but it is historically and politically weak. The argument that an indi-
vidual right to obtain privileges in another state includes as a necessary corollary the right to
travel there is a logical and supportable textual inference.
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and paid to the state. Crandall refused to report the number of
passengers carried out of state by his stage and refused to pay the
tax. Nevada argued to the court that the state tax did not violate
the commerce clause or the import clause. No right to travel was
mentioned. Justice Miller agreed that the tax did not violate either
clause but reversed the conviction on the grounds that the tax inter-
fered with the right to travel. Miller argued that interference with
travel violated the supremacy clause because it impeded federal gov-
ernment operations by burdening persons who travel in order to
deal with federal agencies."' The failure to cite article IV may have
resulted from failure to argue it. Article IV is a better basis for the
right to travel, because Miller's abstract argument only supports the
right to travel to deal with the federal government. His method of
argument applied to article IV, however, supports the right to travel
interstate for any purpose.
In Edwards v. California,'37 the Court struck down a California
statute prohibiting the transportation of indigents into the state as
invalidly interfering with interstate commerce. Justices Douglas
and Jackson concurred on the grounds that the right was a privilege
or immunity of federal citizenship under the fourteenth
amendment.
The majority preference for commerce clause analysis may have
been affected by the state's "historical exception" argument. Cali-
fornia noted that the Articles of Confederation expressly excepted
paupers from those entitled to the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens and argued that article IV was intended to perpetuate the Arti-
cles' limitations. The court may have feared that an article IV right
to travel would perpetuate the restrictions on travel permissible in
1787. An historical intent argument would similarly affect com-
merce clause use to prohibit the exclusion of paupers. If the com-
merce clause was "framed upon the theory that the peoples of the
several States must sink or swim together,"' 38 the omission of the
pauper exception in article IV constitutional privileges and immuni-
136. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) ("For all the great purposes
for which the Federal government was formed, we are one people with one common country.
We are all citizens of the United States; and as members of the same community. must have
the right to pass and repass through every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our
own States."). In Dred Scolt v. Sandford, Taney indicated that the right to enter and stay in
other states was one of the protected privileges. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 416-17 (1856).
137. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
138. Baldwin v. Selig, 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935), quoted in Edwards v. California. 314
U.S. 160, 174 (1941).
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ties could result from a similar theory. More likely, the Framers
understood that the right to travel was not unlimited. States re-
tained the right to exclude persons posing a danger to the state from
crime (fugitives from justice) or contagion.' 39 The Framers may
have thought indigence posed a similar problem, but they did not
embody any such assumption into the Constitution. The state need
not support the poor, and poverty alone is not a threat to health or
safety. As Justice Jackson said in the Edwards concurrence, "[t]he
mere state of being without funds is a neutral fact- constitutionally
an irrelevance, like race, creed or color."" °
Justices Douglas and Jackson disapproved of the majority's reli-
ance on the commerce clause as the source of individual rights.' 4 '
The commerce clause, although plausible support for Edwards, is
weak support for the right to travel because it is a grant of power to
Congress which could pass laws restricting travel. The Edwards
concurrence relied instead on the fourteenth amendment privileges
and immunities clause to recognize the right to travel as a privilege
of national citizenship.
Douglas's opinion rejected article IV as the basis of decision be-
cause it deals primarily "with the incidents of residence... and the
exercise of rights within a State, so a citizen of one State is not in a
condition of alienage when 'he is within or when he removes to an-
other State.' "42 He said that article IV cannot justify Crandall
because the statute in that case applied both to Nevada citizens and
to citizens of other states. But if the right to travel is found in arti-
cle IV as a corollary of the right to receive privileges in the several
states, it applies to the natives of a state desiring to leave as well as
to persons from other states desiring to enter. As a right secured by
article IV to all citizens, under the fourteenth amendment it is also
a privilege and immunity of United States citizenship. 4 3 The privi-
139. See Edwards, 314 U.S. at 184 (Jackson, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 184-85.
141. "To hold that the measure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to result
eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing human rights." Id. at 182
(Jackson, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 180 (citation omitted).
143. Douglas, referring to Miller's opinion in the Slaughterhouse Cases, said that "his
failure to classify that right as one of state citizenship protected solely by Article IV, § 2,
underscores his view that the free movement of persons throughout this nation was a right of
national citizenship." Id. at 180. But Miller cited article IV of the Articles of Confederation,
including the provision on free ingress and regress, stated the privileges and immunities of
article IV of the Articles and of the Constitution are the same. and then said, "In the Articles
of Confederation we have some of these specifically mentioned, and enough perhaps to give
some general idea of the class of civil rights meant by the phrase." The Slaughterhouse
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leges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment is not a
separate source of rights under Justice Miller's interpretation in the
Slaughterhouse Cases but protects only national privileges and im-
munities existing prior to the amendment's adoption."
Justice Jackson's concurrence in Edwards pointed to the inter-
pretation of privileges and immunities as susceptible to a natural
law interpretation that could free the Court to strike down any dis-
favored law without reference to specific values articulated in the
document. Jackson wrote:
For nearly three-quarters of a century this Court rejected every
plea to the privileges and immunities clause [of the fourteenth
amendment].... This Court... has always hesitated to give any
real meaning to the privileges and immunities clause lest it im-
providently give too much. This Court should, however, hold
squarely that it is a privilege of citizenship of the United States,
protected from state abridgment, to enter any state of the Union,
either for temporary sojourn or for the establishment of perma-
nent residence therein and for gaining resultant citizenship
thereof. If national citizenship means less than this, it means
nothing. 145
This fear has distorted perceptions of article IV privileges and
immunities. On its face, article IV should apply to citizens in the
state of which they are citizens. That state is also one of "the sev-
eral states" in which they are entitled to the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens. If citizens of a state were to be protected only in
states where they were not citizens, the article should have used the
phrase "in any other of the states." But protecting a citizen in one's
home state is meaningless unless one is entitled to some substantive
right beyond that already possessed under state law. If article IV
privileges and immunities include natural law principles, courts
could invalidate state laws as contrary to natural law-the very fear
that disturbed the Slaughterhouse majority:
[Article IV] did not create those rights, which it called privileges
and immunities of citizens of the states. It threw around them in
that clause no security for the citizen of the state in which they
were claimed or exercised. Nor did it profess to control the
power of the state governments over the rights of its own
citizens.
Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1873). In listing the rights of national citizenship protected
by the fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause, Miller included rights al-
ready protected by other clauses of the Constitution, such as the right to petition peacefully
for redress of grievances.
144. See The Slaughterhouse Cases, at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
145. 314 U.S. at 182-83 (footnote omitted).
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Its sole purpose was to declare to the several states, that
whatever those rights, as you grant or establish them to your
own citizens, or as you limit or qualify, or impose restrictions on
their exercise, the same, neither more nor less, shall be the mea-
sure of the rights of citizens of other states within your
jurisdiction.146
Historically, the article IV privileges and immunities clause pro-
fessed to control state power over the right of citizens to leave and
reenter. Recognition of that substantive right would not necessarily
revive fundamental rights analysis or extend any greater right to a
citizen in a state than the right to leave.
One final reason for ignoring article IV as the source of the right
to travel is the Court's holding that it protects only against state
action.' 47 Under those precedents, a constitutional right to travel
against private interference must be traced to another source.
Congress can legislate against private interference with inter-
state travel under the commerce clause. The pressure to find that
such private behavior is not only subject to Congressional power
but is itself a violation of the Constitution arose out of 1960's civil
rights activity. Statutes enacted in the wake of the Civil War made
deprivation of constitutional rights a federal criminal offense with-
out defining the rights. Congress enacted nothing specifically pun-
ishing interstate travel interference. When Lemuel Penn, a
northern black visiting a family in the south, was shot by persons
who thought he was working for civil rights, it affronted northern
civil rights workers. However, state court prosecution for civil
rights murders was difficult; several defendants were found not
guilty of Penn's murder despite strong evidence. Federal authori-
ties tried to obtain a conviction in federal courts, but the only avail-
able statute applied to the deprivation of constitutional rights. In
coping with the civil rights revolution and trying to find federal law
applicable, the Court found a right of travel that may be claimed
against individual as well as governmental interference.' 48 The
court ignored the constitutional text as an express source for the
146. 83 U.S. at 77.
147. In United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920), article IV was used as a basis for
analyzing the right of interstate travel. That case resulted in dismissal of an indictment of
private individuals for conspiracy to deprive individuals of their constitutional rights on the
grounds that the right of interstate travel applies only against the state. The Court cited
United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) for the proposition that article IV privileges and
immunities "like the 14th Amendment, is directed against state action." 106 U.S. at 643.
Harris, however, did not deal with the right to travel.
148. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
right, because all texts appeared limited to establishing a right
against the state.
Curiously, article IV provides the best basis for finding a consti-
tutional right to travel applicable against individuals. Unlike the
commerce clause, the inference of a right to travel is not drawn
from the allocation of government power. Unlike the fourteenth
amendment, article IV is an individual right rather than a limit on
state power. Article IV privileges and immunities may be limited to
those granted by the state, but if the right to travel is inferred from
the entitlement to privileges in other states, any entity preventing
the citizen of one state from traveling to another state to obtain
rights from that state would be interfering with the constitutional
right. Thus, the right to travel could be applicable not only against
state government, but also against private individuals and the fed-
eral government.
However, the scope of the article IV right is slightly ambiguous.
The clause came from the Articles of Confederation provision in an
agreement among independent sovereigns not directed at the con-
duct of individual citizens. The Continental Congress had no
power to legislate for individuals and could not restrict interstate
movement. The same clause in the Constitution had a new context.
The agreement was "of the People" and not "of the States." Indi-
viduals theoretically could be bound by the document. Further, the
federal government was given power to legislate directly upon indi-
viduals; therefore, federal power to restrict interstate movement be-
came relevant. The reasoning which applied the right to interstate
travel against private interference is valid whether rooted in article
IV or in purely structural analysis. Linguistically, article IV could
ground the same inferences that the Court drew from the national
structure. It is written in terms of an individual right to obtain
privileges and immunities in other states, so interference with the
implicit right to travel to get those privileges could be a violation of
the right, whether by private persons or by government.
Justice O'Connor is on excellent historical ground in rooting the
right to travel in the article IV privileges and immunities clause.
There are other advantages. Unlike the commerce clause, it can
prohibit federal interference with interstate travel. Unlike the four-
teenth amendment, it is not linguistically confined to a governmen-
tal prohibition. The use of article IV as the basis for the right to
travel supports an important guarantee with constitutional text.
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C. The Right To Be Free of Discrimination Based on Place of
Prior Residence
Durational residence requirements for state governmental bene-
fits do not restrict travel; the new residents suffer no loss by such a
requirement in their new state because they were receiving no bene-
fit from that state before they moved. Failure to grant the benefit is
not a restriction on travel, but rather a discrimination against recent
residents. That sort of discrimination led the Court to use equal
protection analysis to test the validity of such durational residence
requirements. 149 The Court frequently invalidated durational resi-
dence requirements because their purpose was to prevent residents'
benefits from encouraging nonresidents to become residents. Dis-
couraging persons from becoming residents is not a legitimate state
objective. National citizenship implies the right to travel to another
state and to establish residence there. Thus, the Court refers to the
right to travel in the durational residence cases but continues to use
the equal protection clause rationale in its decisions.150 It refuses to
root the right to establish residence in a new state in article IV,
leaving it a vague inference from the nature of national government.
If the Court acknowledged article IV as the source of the right to
establish residence and citizenship in another state, it could avoid
equal protection analysis in these cases.
These decisions have complicated an already complex equal pro-
tection analysis. The state may offer administrative convenience
justifications for a residence requirement passing minimal scrutiny
under equal protection, yet the Court finds the justifications inade-
quate. The higher degree of scrutiny does not flow from the denial
of a fundamental right: the statute denies no fundamental right.
The classification distinguishing between persons on the basis of
length of residence does not share other suspect class characteris-
tics. As Justice Harlan argued in Shapiro, where the grant of a ben-
efit turns on the exercise or nonexercise of a protected right, the
Court should normally analyze the state's behavior by whether it
impairs the constitutional right and not whether it violates the equal
protection clause.
Justice O'Connor developed the article IV right to travel theory
in Zobel in the context of an Alaskan statute that distributed sur-
plus state revenues to citizens on a graduated scale based on length
of residence. The majority invalidated the statute under the equal
149. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
150. Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 106 S. Ct. 2317 (1986).
1987]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
protection clause, holding that rewarding citizens for past contribu-
tions was not a legitimate state purpose. Justice O'Connor dis-
agreed, noting that some forms of compensation for past service to
the state should be permissible. The determination of proper forms
of compensation for past services should be judged, she argued,
under standards derived from article IV. Although she used the
term "right to travel" in conformity with past Court usage in dura-
tional residence cases, article IV application to a durational resi-
dence requirement is a separate concern.
Justice O'Connor noted that the clause assured a citizen of one
state who ventures into another state the same privileges that citi-
zens of that state enjoy. If a nonresident who enters for temporary
commercial purposes is protected, "[a]fortiori, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause should protect the 'citizens of State A who ven-
tures into State B' to settle there and establish a home."''
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, contended that article IV could
not apply to the Alaskan scheme because "the clause has no appli-
cation to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of.'
' 52
Justice O'Connor responded that application of article IV was not
limited to benefit nonresidents.
The fact that this discrimination unfolds after the nonresident
establishes residency does not insulate Alaska's scheme from
scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Each
group of citizens who migrated to Alaska in the past, or chooses
to move there in the future, lives in the State on less favorable
terms than those who arrived earlier. The circumstances that
some of the disfavored citizens already live in Alaska does not
negate the fact that "the citizen of State A who ventures into
[Alaska]" to establish a home labors under a continuous
disability. 1
53
Article IV supports Justice O'Connor's position."' It applies to
citizens of each state "in the several states," including the citizen's
home state. The courts rarely find that article IV binds a state with
respect to its own citizens, fearing a judicially defined "fundamental
right" state law limit. That fear is groundless in Justice O'Connor's
limited article IV context.
Article IV's privileges and immunities clause application to resi-
151. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 74 (1982).
152. Id. at 84 n.3.
153. Id. at 75.
154. The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
(i.e., to become indistinguishable from natives) in the several states (i.e.. in any state of the
union where they wish to go to become a citizen of that state).
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dence requirements is historically correct. The earliest Articles of
Confederation drafts of the clause specified application only to per-
sons going to reside in another state. Consequently, the concern
that persons changing residence to a new state be treated as citizens
in that state appears to be a major reason for the constitutional arti-
cle. The extension of the privileges and immunities of citizens to
nonresidents was not intended to eliminate the earlier language's
protection of new residents. Burke of North Carolina understood
the clause to eliminate durational residence voting requirements.
State constitutions had granted foreigners property rights upon en-
tering the state and swearing allegiance but imposed a one-year resi-
dence requirement to become a citizen. If article IV recaptured the
colonial citizenship privileges and immunities, the right to become
a citizen of a state by change of residence to that state is embodied
in the clause. The framers understood that one of the substantive
privileges of citizenship is freedom from discrimination based on
place of prior residence.
The adoption of the fourteenth amendment making state citi-
zenship a function of federal citizenship and state residence does not
prevent article IV from conferring all the privileges and immunities
of state citizenship on persons relocating to the state. The four-
teenth amendment citizenship provisions responded to Justice Ta-
ney's statement in Dred Scott that Blacks were not United States
citizens and not entitled to sue as state citizens under article III
diversity of citizenship provisions. The fourteenth amendment as-
sures that Blacks born in the United States are recognized as citi-
zens of both the United States and each state.1 55 The fourteenth
amendment determines who are the citizens of each state that are
entitled under article IV to the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states. Article IV secures the substantive right to a
citizen of a state to not be discriminated against on the basis of prior
residence.
Article IV's history does not foreclose all durational residence
requirements. A provision enacted to promote federalism amid an
article that secures in each state full faith and credit for the laws of
other states should not be interpreted to forbid state residence re-
quirements established to prevent the evasion of other states' poli-
155. In Gassies v. Ballon, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 761 (1832), the Supreme Court held that an
allegation of United States citizenship and Louisiana residence is the equivalent of an allega-
tion of state citizenship for article III purposes. Thus, the proposition that state citizenship
was a function of residence plus federal citizenship was accepted prior to the fourteenth
amendment.
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cies. "' Residence requirements for voting and holding office
existed when the privileges and immunities clause was adopted,
although there was some uncertainty over its effect on them. The
rationale for the limits may have been the difficulty in ascertaining
an individual's permanent intention to reside when interstate com-
munication was by horse or sail and checking past residence was
difficult and time consuming. Modern consideration of the consti-
tutionality of residence requirements must take into account im-
provements in transportation and communication. Durational
residence requirements to establish the bona fides of the residence
claim may also be affected by the nature of the benefit sought. The
decisions need not be affected by changing the analysis from equal
protection to article IV. Article IV analysis, however, assures that
the court will focus on the impact of the residence requirement on
full recognition as citizen of the state.
D. The Right of Nonresidents to Freedom from Discrimination
The current Court disagrees over article IV's application to the
right to travel and durational residence cases, but agrees that the
clause prohibits discrimination in the privileges and immunities of
citizens against nonresidents entering the state. It further disagrees
on the meaning of "privilege or immunity" and distinguishes state
laws under article IV, holding some laws create privileges and im-
munities of citizenship and some do not. The right to engage in a
trade or business is a privilege or immunity of citizenship.' 57 The
right to hunt elk is not, because it is not "basic to the maintenance
or well-being of the Union."' 58 The Court has avoided defining the
phrase beyond that necessary to each decision.5 9 Among the rights
outside the clause are the right to vote 6 ° and the right to state-
owned goods. 16 1 Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall reject this
method of analysis. They would find that all rights of citizens are
privileges and immunities and would decide the cases solely on
whether the discrimination against nonresidents is justified. 62
The majority suggests a two-step analysis under the article IV
privileges and immunities clause: first, whether the particular law
156. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
157. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
158. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978).
159. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
160. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
161. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 386.
162. Id. at 394 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall and White.)
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involves a privilege or immunity of citizenship; and, if so, whether
the different nonresident treatment is justified. The dissenters con-
tend that only the second step is relevant. The selective colonial
application of privileges and immunities and the exclusion of local
variations from coverage were justified by local conditions. An ade-
quate justification for disparity in treatment meant that a particular
law was not a privilege or immunity. The court should borrow
from dormant commerce clause analysis in which initial attempts to
define its operation on a categorical basis were rejected in favor of
an individualized analysis.163 Privileges and immunities analysis
should be parallel: citizens of each state are entitled to all rights
afforded state natives unless there is a valid ground for denial.164
163. Julian Eule has suggested that the article IV privileges and immunities clause is the
appropriate constitutional text for use in proscribing protectionist state legislation. Eule,
Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 446-48 (1982). He would
view the commerce clause as purely a grant of power to the federal government without
implying any restriction on state power.
Madison's criticism of the violations of the Articles of Confederation privileges and im-
munities clause was leveled at state laws taxing vessels at a differential rate based on the
owner's and crew's state of citizenship. The practice of port states taxing the imports of other
states trading through them, however, he said resulted from the lack of a general commerce
power. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Where the discrimination was based on
place of origin or destination of the goods or services rather than the trader's place of resi-
dence, there was no apparent violation of the privileges and immunities clause. Instead of
protecting free trade, the clause protected only the recognition of common citizenship as it
had existed prior to independence. A shift from reliance on the commerce clause to article IV
reliance to protect interstate commerce would not only be inconsistent with the history of the
clauses, but could curtail existing flexibility. Under the commerce clause, Congress may au-
thorize state laws that protect local industries if it finds such behavior desirable. The privi-
leges and immunities clause is drafted as an individual right, however, and it would not be
reasonable to permit Congress to deprive individuals of constitutional rights. For that rea-
son, extension of article IV to perform tasks it was not designed to do is dangerously unwise.
164. This past term the Supreme Court heard a case in which the federal district court in
New Orleans refused to admit to practice before it, a member of the Louisiana bar who lived
and had his office in Mississippi. Frazier v. Heebe, 107 S. Ct. 2607 (1987). A similar state
residence requirement was held to violate article IV when applied by a state. Supreme Court
of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985). One issue raised in the case was whether article IV
restricted the federal government as opposed to solely states, however, the Supreme Court did
not reach the article IV question and reversed on different grounds.
The Court has labeled article IV privileges and immunities as those of state citizenship.
That labeling dissipates any article IV claim against the federal government because it indi-
cates that the claimant is entitled only to the treatment given a citizen by the state. If the
clause requires that nonresident citizens be treated as citizens of that state, regardless of the
source of treatment, article IV applies. The framers of article IV chose individual rights
language rather than language of state restriction. On the other hand, the framers did not
envision the current scope of federal power. A national government more provincial than the
states themselves was not considered, and the clause was initially in a document consisting
soley of separate state sovereigns. Thus history and language point in different directions.
If article IV does not bind the federal government, Congress might authorize state dis-
crimination against nonresidents. The state law might be invalid as state law under article
19871
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One reason for adopting the dissenters' view is that the language
of article IV was intended to perform several different functions.
For the person changing residence, it secured every right of a citi-
zen. Thus, the all encompassing definition is warranted. This was
the practice that preceded the constitutional provision. On the
other hand, the nonresident who visited the state did not have the
same rights as citizens of the state. Visitors could not vote and they
were subject to differences in civil process because of the problems
of exercising power over nonresidents. "Privileges and immunities"
function differently depending on the individual claimant's status.
One is entitled to a particular benefit or exemption from a burden if
there is no adequate justification for distinction. A citizen of the
United States has a privilege or immunity to not be discriminated
against on the basis of place of residence without adequate justifica-
tion. Exclusion and protectionism are inadequate justifications.
Determination of the sufficiency of justifications for differential
treatment of persons based on citizenship is still in a formative
stage. Efforts to draw the lines of permissible distinctions depend
more on current analysis than historic meaning, because the draft-
ers paid little attention to the specific problems. Elaboration on the
manner of linedrawing has already begun.' 65
The nondiscrimination issue may arise in a unique fashion.
Most laws favoring residents over nonresidents in trading run afoul
of commerce clause restrictions as well as article IV problems.
Privileges and immunities discrimination analysis is invoked pri-
marily where the law addresses nonresidents doing intrastate busi-
ness. It is thus particularly relevant to the problems raised by the
application of the "market participant" commerce clause doctrine.
The Supreme Court has held that states are not subject to com-
merce clause restrictions when acting as market participants rather
than as market regulators. Thus, the state may choose to buy goods
or services from, or to sell to, residents exclusively without implicat-
IV, but it could escape scrutiny incorporated as federal law. The structure and placement of
this right indicates a concern for federalism rather than for an individual's protection. Never-
theless, the article requires that the right to interstate travel be secure against national as well
as local restriction.
Article IV applied to the federal government would not inhibit justifiable federal legisla-
tion preferring residents of a state. It permits discrimination against nonresidents who pose a
problem separate from parochial state interests in excluding community nonmembers. If the
clause does not apply, the federal government may discriminate against nonresidents simply
to satisfy parochial interests. A congressional majority could be mustered for provincialism,
but it would destroy the article IV's national sense of citizenship.
165. See Varat, State "Citizenship- and Interstate Equality, 48 U. Ci. L. REV. 487
(1981).
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ing the commerce clause.' 66 Nevertheless, in United Building &
Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,'67 the Court held
that such purchase and sale decisions are subject to article IV privi-
leges and immunities. The Court remanded the case to determine
whether the nonresidents constituted a "peculiar source of the evil
at which the statute is aimed."' 68
Article IV applies to state and municipal market decisions when
government decisions turn on the residence of the employees and
management of a company rather than on its state of incorporation.
Thus, although a corporation may lack article IV rights,'6 9 its em-
166. Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (South Dakota operated a cement plant
restricting sales to state residents. Supreme Court held the resident-preference program did
not violate commerce clause (citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810
(1976) ("Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the
absence of congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over other.")); White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Em-
ployers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (Supreme Court held that commerce clause does not prevent
mayor from requiring construction projects to employ at least 50% city residents).
167. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
168. Id. at 222.
169. Under the current Supreme Court decisions, the privileges and immunities clause
applies only to human beings. Corporations are not "citizens" for the purposes of article IV.
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868). Hamilton linked article IV protections to
article III diversity jurisdiction, and Taney did the same in Dred Scott. Nevertheless, present
doctrine allows corporations to sue and be sued as citizens under the diversity of jurisdiction
provisions of article III but does not permit them to claim article IV privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens.
The exclusion of corporations from article IV protection has been criticized.
The notion that corporations are not citizens for purposes of the privileges and
immunities clause is more venerable than sound. It is, after all, people who do
business in the corporate form, and the underlying antidiscrimination objectives of
the clause can be thwarted as much by state discrimination against businesses incor-
porated in other states as by state discrimination against natural persons who make
their homes in other states.
Varat, supra note 176, at 499 n.47.
The framers of the privileges and immunities clause did not consider corporations to be
citizens for the purposes of the clause. The various drafts of the article as it wound its way
into the Articles of Confederation referred to the protected class as "inhabitants," "citizens,"
and "free inhabitants." The standard of protection is variously the privileges of "natives,"
"'natural born free Citizens," and "free citizens." These terms, especially the adjective "free,"
are applied to human beings and not abstract entities. The term "citizen" in the Constitution
bears no indicia of an alteration to give it a special meaning applicable to corporations.
When the article was adopted, the corporation was an exceptional mode of doing busi-
ness. Legislatures were suspicious of the corporate form. They granted charters only for
exceptional purposes such as educational institutions, canals and water companies. J. DAVIS,
ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 22 (1917). If the grant of
corporate status by one state were thought capable of imposing that corporation on other
states, it would have aroused the bitter opposition of every state in the union. Madison had
even noted that the power of a state to confer citizenship on an individual on a different basis
than that of other states had been a source of friction for article IV of the Articles of Confed-
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ployees may claim that the state's market decisions deny those
rights to them.
Neither language nor history helps much in assessing the appro-
priateness of the Court's application of article IV to governmental
behavior as a market participant. Language alone does not deter-
mine whether the opportunity to compete for government contracts
is a privilege or immunity of citizens in the state. The circum-
stances of eighteenth-century governmental behavior mask the
Framers' intent. Difficulty in transportation and communication
largely confined governmental purchases and sales to local busi-
nesses. The creation of local preferences in this manner is not rele-
vant to the constitutional issue.
Where an issue is not determined by language or history, a deci-
sion should be based on policy consistent with the constitutional
language, history and structure. Article IV does not have the free
trade focus of the commerce clause for which the state's regulatory
or participatory character is relevant. Article IV creates a common
national citizenship for citizens of the several states. The relevance
of the state of residence is diminished. In that context, the Court's
response is appropriate. States may favor residents in using their
resources to participate in the market, but the favoritism must be
eration. Thus, the grant to Congress of power to make uniform rules for naturalization was
an important element in improving the function of article IV in the Constitution.
Although the history of article IV demonstrates conclusively that corporations were not
considered "citizens" for article IV purposes when the Constitution was adopted, the corpo-
ration has substantially altered its place in American society since that date. Exclusion of
corporations from the ambit of article IV had little significance in 1787 when the small
number of existing corporations were local in scope, and almost all business was conducted
by individuals or partnerships. Corporate status is no longer a jealously guarded special priv-
ilege, but a readily available status frequently used by almost every form of business en-
deavor. Thus, Jonathan Varat has suggested that corporations should be considered
"citizens" for article IV purposes in order to assure the vindication of the overriding purpose
of nondiscrimination.
The interests of article IV in preventing state discrimination against nonresidents have not
been ignored by the Supreme Court in connection with corporations. Instead, it has used the
commerce clause and the equal protection clause to preserve the market viability of the com-
panies incorporated in other states. One crucial step in the Court's article IV analysis was
that the corporation's characteristics are not natural ones but defined by state law. Conse-
quently, a corporation has no existence as such in any state where it is not incorporated. This
led to decisions permitting states to charge a special tax of companies incorporated in other
states as a "privilege" of doing business within a state. With the demise of the "privilege"
tax, there is little need for additional protection for corporations under article IV.
The application of article IV results in an individual right that cannot be removed by
Congress. It seems unwise to extend to the artificial creatures of a state a right to be free from
discriminatory regulation by other states even where Congress finds such discrimination
desirable.
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justified. Therefore, the relevance of residence becomes the crucial
issue when applying article IV.
VI. CONCLUSION
The constitutional article IV privileges and immunities clause
evolved from a national colonial heritage. Colonial inhabitants
were all originally the King's subjects, and no colony treated the
inhabitants of other colonies as aliens. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence destroyed this basis for unity. Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation supplied the missing ties and preserved each of the
colonial rights-to move freely between colonies, to be treated as a
native of any colony where residence was established, and to be free
of discrimination based on place of birth in commercial dealings.
The Articles provided no common sovereign for the people of
the states. Individuals were citizens of a state according to state
law. The only basis for national citizenship was asserted through
the privileges and immunities clause. The Constitution created a
national government which unified the disparate state governments.
The constitutional privileges and immunities clause again cemented
the ties among the states, but United States citizenship altered the
clause's meaning and effect: a single sentence accomplished the di-
verse functions of the Articles of Confederation's provisions.
The clause's origin in the traditional rights of Englishmen pro-
duced an ambiguity which has been the source of a restricted consti-
tutional definition of privileges and immunities. Colonists referred
to the rights of Englishmen when they claimed broader rights of
self-government and individual liberty than England granted them.
When they decided to break with England, they justified their ac-
tion by claiming they had been denied not just the rights of English-
men, but of all people.
The privileges and immunities clause was intended to secure the
former intercolonial privileges of movement, citizenship, and trade.
It was not intended to institute natural law concepts; but the use of
language that had been appropriated in political argument for that
purpose enabled later generations to conflate and thus utterly con-
fuse the possible meanings of the clause. One consequence of that
confusion has been to discourage the Court from resting any sub-
stantive rights in the language of article IV. Recent attempts by
Justice O'Connor to return the Court to article IV as the source of
basic rights of interstate movement may restore the original promi-
nence of that provision.
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